On Jun 21, 2013, at 2:56 PM, John C Klensin <john-ietf(_at_)jck(_dot_)com>
wrote:
While I agree with the above (and am still trying to avoid
carrying this conversation very far on the IETF list), I think
another part of the puzzle is that there are also situations in
which technical considerations imply real constraints on policy
alternatives. Some obvious examples include physical constants
like the speed of light, others, only slightly less obvious,
include things like the design of the DNS as a simply hierarchy
that cannot support symmetric aliases (i.e., anything that would
support an actual "came from" function or a list of all of the
names that point to a given note). The policy folks ignore
those constraints, or treat them as subject to policy-making
decisions at the risk of being ridiculous and/or causing
considerable harm to the Internet. While they are less obvious
in this community, I suggest it works the other way too -- there
are policy and economic decisions and realities that are as much
constraints on the technical solution space as those technical
constrains are on the policy ones, with just about the same
risks of ridiculousness or damage if they are ignored.
Agreed. I believe that there is a better understanding of this
situation now than in the earlier days (including among governments
who are beginning to seriously engage with ICANN's GAC.)
That is, again, why it is so unfortunate that the original model
of the IAB/PSO as one of ICANN's three "everyone has to work
together" pillars was abandoned... and more unfortunate that it
was replaced on the ICANN side by approximately nothing other
than some committees and other bodies that could easily be
ignored and on the IETF side by depending on individuals with
feet in both camps to speak up.
It's difficult to lay blame anyone from walking away from the PSO approach;
in ICANN's early years it always seemed to be a vestigial structure serving
little purpose. The lack of apparent value was amplified when ICANN changed
its proposed structure (from being oversight and coordination between true
independent supporting organizations) into a heavily DNS-focused direction
by opting to absorb the DNSO internally in the initial Singapore meeting.
If ICANN were operating solely in a coordination and oversight role, with
policy, process, and protocol development done in supporting organizations,
then it would have been a lot easier to make the liaison and coordination
function successful, both between pillars (DNSO, ASO, PSO) and to/from
governmental types. For some reason, doing that in the margin of a 97%
DNS-focused omnibus policy/oversight/coordination/operation organization
doesn't provide the necessary level of attention.
FYI,
/John
Disclaimers: My views alone. Apologies for length; I lacked the time to
write a shorter reply.