I read this draft and tried to participate in shaping into something I as an
operator believe useful in SIDR WG, but to no avail -- IMO because the protocol
work, and then the requirements work, were largely completed already. I
believe this approach will cause more harm than good and result in more
instability than security, and it leaves some considerable holes with which I
am actually concerned about related to inter-domain routing security (and
autonomy) on the Internet. As such, myself and some other operators published
this document, which has since been accepted and evolved as a WG document
within the Global Routing Operations WG (GROW):
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-grow-simple-leak-attack-bgpsec-no-help-02
I've given up on SIDR, I wish them well….
-danny
On Sep 9, 2013, at 6:26 PM, The IESG <iesg-secretary(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org> wrote:
The IESG has received a request from the Secure Inter-Domain Routing WG
(sidr) to consider the following document:
- 'Threat Model for BGP Path Security'
<draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-06.txt> as Informational RFC
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org mailing lists by 2013-09-23. Exceptionally, comments
may be
sent to iesg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.
Abstract
This document describes a threat model for the context in which
(E)BGP path security mechanisms will be developed. The threat model
includes an analysis of the RPKI, and focuses on the ability of an AS
to verify the authenticity of the AS path info received in a BGP
update. We use the term PATHSEC to refer to any BGP path security
technology that makes use of the RPKI. PATHSEC will secure BGP
[RFC4271], consistent with the inter-AS security focus of the RPKI
[RFC6480].
The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are
considered to be threats, and examines classes of attacks that might
be launched against PATHSEC. It does not revisit attacks against
unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in
[RFC4271]. It concludes with brief discussion of residual
vulnerabilities.
The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats/
IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats/ballot/
No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.
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