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RE: [sidr] Last Call: <draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-21.txt> (RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation) to Best Current Practice

2013-09-26 16:20:21
From: Randy Bush [mailto:randy(_at_)psg(_dot_)com]

i don't even know what geographic redundancy is, alternate earths?
[WEG] nah, the latency is too high until we sort out IP over Quantum 
Entanglement. ;-) Geographic redundancy in the context of things that live on 
servers is that it exists on servers in more than one physical location (e.g. 
Datacenter East and Datacenter West) so that there isn't a single point of 
failure. In this case, that'd probably be in the form of two caches backing 
each other up (router configured to use both).

 if
you mean redundant network topology, i think it is more than that.  i
really think physical line length matters.  as i said, the longer the
circuit the more likely a boat anchor will whack it.  hence close.
[WEG] yes, but ultimately that's dependent on your network topology. If "close" 
is the only way to mitigate that (vs having a truly redundant backup that 
doesn't share any topology in its path), then sure, that's what you do. But I 
don't think it directly translates to "should be close". We clearly disagree, 
but I'm not going to belabor the point any further.


i think i understand what you want made more explicit.  today's try

   To relieve routers of the load of performing certificate validation,
   cryptographic operations, etc., the RPKI-Router protocol, [RFC6810],
   does not provide object-based security to the router.  I.e. the
   router can not validate the data cryptographically from a well-known
   trust anchor.  The router trusts the cache to provide correct data
   and relies on transport based security for the data received from the
   cache.  Therefore the authenticity and integrity of the data from the
   cache should be well protected, see Section 7 of [RFC6810].

   As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI
   data, operators SHOULD locate RPKI caches close to routers that
   require these data and services in order to minimize the impact of
   likely failures in local routing, intermediate devices, long
   circuits, etc.  One should also consider trust boundaries, routing
   bootstrap reachability, etc.  E.g. a router should bootstrap from a
   chache which is reachable with minimal reliance on other
   infrastructure such as DNS or routing protocols.

   For example, if a router needs its BGP and/or IGP to converge for the
   router to reach a cache, once a cache is reachable, the router will
   then have to reevaluate prefixes already learned via BGP.  Such
   configurations should be avoided if possible.

[WEG] close enough, ship it.

Wes

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