On Fri, Apr 25, 2014 at 11:21 AM, Dave Crocker <dhc(_at_)dcrocker(_dot_)net>
wrote:
On 4/25/2014 7:56 AM, Ned Freed wrote:
An obvious counterexample is what recently happened in perpass and
the various works it has started. Regardless of what anyone thinks of
perpass or its outcome, a fair characterization is that it was an
IETF repsonse to the message delivered by Snoden et al.
Yup. It's a singular example, but that's the point. It's not what the IETF
(usually) does.
It's fine that it's being attempted and it might (or might not) prove
useful. But there is no pattern of the IETF doing such a thing.
There is really no precedent for discovering that a rogue agency was
conspiring to sabotage efforts to provide Internet security.
It is not just the IETF that has ben responding in unusual ways.
For the past thirty years we have been building a technology trap that
civilization now depends on. And anyone who looks into the structure
of that technology trap will realize that all the critical
infrastructure is now linked to the net in ways that can create
enormous amounts of fear and panic albeit with little risk of
catastrophic consequences.
Fear and panic are themselves capable of creating serious
consequences, consider that the response to 9/11 was to start not just
one but two wars.
And now we find that the government agency charged with COMSEC
assurance was actually committing resources to subverting COMSEC
efforts. In many cases efforts that were funded by other parts of the
US government.
This is really not a usual situation at all.
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