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Gen-ART LC Review of draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm-14

2014-09-11 18:20:15
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at

<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.

Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.

Document:  
draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm-14
Reviewer: Ben Campbell
Review Date: 2014-09-11
IETF LC End Date: 2014-09-11

Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a proposed standard, but 
there are open issues that should be addressed first.

Note: I have not attempted to verify the pseudocode fragments in this draft. 

Major issues:

[Note: I am on the fence on whether the following is a major or minor issue. I 
put it in the major section to draw attention to it, but I am prepared to 
downgrade it if discussion seems to suggest doing so.]

-- Section 9.4, SSRC Management

If I read this section correctly, the draft requires central management of SSRC 
values when you have a master key shared among endpoints in a SRTP session, and 
goes so far to require authentication of data a central SSRC manager. This 
seems like a pretty big architectural change to the handling of SSRC that would 
likely be an impediment to deployment.  I also have to wonder if such an SSRC 
manager could become a central point of attack.

I note that RFC 3711, section 9.1 talks about what I gather is the same issue, 
and does not seem to call for a central SSRC manager. Are the requirements here 
that different than for 3711?

Minor issues:

-- General:

There are a number of instances of 2119 normative language that I suspect do 
not define new normative requirements as much as repeat normative requirements 
from elsewhere (either in this draft, or from elsewhere.) This creates 
confusion on which text is authoritative, and creates an opportunity for 
inconsistent normative statements about the same thing. I strongly suggest that 
anytime you repeat or summarize normative text that is authoritatively stated 
elsewhere, you either use descriptive (non-normative) language (e.g., Foo is 
required to bar the baz), or clearly attribute the source (e.g. [XXX] says that 
foo MUST bar the baz.)

-- References:

The draft has normative down ref to RFC 3610. This was not explicitly mentioned 
in the IETF last call email, and does not appear to be included in the down ref 
registry.

-- 8.1:

If this draft contradicts normative language from RFC 3711, it should 
explicitly update 3711.

-- 8.2

Can you offer guidance on when it might be (or not be) necessary to disguise 
the length of the plaintext?  Especially how that might be known at the SRTP 
layer?

-- 14.1:

Does the master salt need to be kept secret? If the answer is "it depends", can 
you offer guidance?

Also, can you offer a definition of "properly erased"?


Nits/editorial comments:

-- There is a citation of RFC2675, but it doesn't appear in the references.

-- The abstract is out of place (Should be at beginning.)

-- section 1, third paragraph: "... provides a high level of security ..."

That may change over time. I suggest prefacing with "At the time of this 
writing..."

-- section 3, last paragraph:

Please expand IV on first mention.

-- section 5.3, last paragraph:

First and last sentence seem to contradict each other.

-- 15.1:

The IANA registration section for the SDES crypto-suites is oddly stated. That 
registry is just a table; the use of the srtp-crypto-suite-ext ABNF 
construction may be confusing.


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