On Sat, Aug 1, 2015 at 11:32 AM, Tal Mizrahi <talmi(_at_)marvell(_dot_)com>
wrote:
Hi Robert,
Thanks for the comments.
We have submitted an updated version of the draft, which addresses the
comments we received from you and other reviewers in IETF last call.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mm-netconf-time-capability-06
Our responses to your comments can be found below.
Please let us know if you have further comments or questions.
Thanks,
Tal and Yoram.
-----Original Message-----
From: ietf [mailto:ietf-bounces(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org] On Behalf Of Robert
Sparks
Sent: Thursday, July 09, 2015 12:40 AM
To: General Area Review Team; ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org;
draft-mm-netconf-time-
capability(_dot_)all(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: Gen-art LC review: draft-mm-netconf-time-capability-05
I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. For background on
Gen- ART, please see the FAQ at
<http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>.
Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.
Document: draft-mm-netconf-time-capability-05
Reviewer: Robert Sparks
Review Date: 8 Jul 2015
IETF LC End Date: 29 Jul 2015
IESG Telechat date: not yet scheduled
Summary: This draft has open issues to address before publication
This draft adds two separable concepts to netconf
* Asking for and receiving knowledge of when a command was executed
* Requesting that a command be executed at a particular time
The utility of the first is obvious, and I have no problems with the
specification of that part of this extension. Would it be better to
pull these apart and progress them separately?
We believe there is a great benefit to defining these two feature
together, although each of them can be used independently. The second
certainly gains from the first, since the execution-time provides feedback
to the client about the actual time of execution compared to the scheduled
time of execution.
IMO returning the execution-time is not needed.
How far from the requested time do you expect the server to be?
Maybe a few milli-seconds?
The utility of the second would be more obvious if the draft didn't
limit the time to be "near future scheduling". It punts on most of the
hard problems with scheduling things outside a very tight range (15
seconds in the future by default), without motivating the advantages of
saying "wait until 5 seconds from now before you do this".
So:
Why was 15 seconds chosen? Could you add a motivating example that
shows why being able to say "now is not good, but 5 seconds from now is
better" is useful? (Something like having a series of things happen as
close to simultaneously without the network delay of sending the
requests impacting how they are separated perhaps?)
Point well taken. We have added the following example, motivating why near
future scheduling (<15 seconds) can be useful:
I don't understand the arbitrary 15 sec. limit.
What problems magically disappear if the timeout is 14 sec vs. 16 sec.?
A typical example of using near-future scheduling is a coordinated commit;
a client needs to trigger a commit at n servers, so that the n servers
perform the commit as close as possible to simultaneously. Without the time
capability, the client sends a sequence of n commit messages, and thus each
server performs the commit at a different time. By using the time
capability, the client can send commit messages that are scheduled to take
place at time Ts, which is 5 seconds in the future, causing the servers to
invoke the commit as close as possible to time Ts.
You should pick a different example because the NETCONF confirmed-commit
procedure is designed to be loose-coupled. The default timeout is 10
minutes.
Since the client needs sessions open with all servers involved in the
network-wide
commit, there is no advantage in staging the <commit> operations 15 sec. in
advance,
to make sure the servers are reachable.
I thought the synchronized <get> on operational state was a good use-case.
Andy
We have also added an explanation of why 15 seconds were chosen as the
default value:
The default value of sched-max-future is defined to be 15 seconds. This
duration is long enough to allow the scheduled RPC to be sent by the
client, potentially to multiple servers, and in some cases to send a
cancellation message, as described in Section 3.2. On the other hand, the
15 second duration yields a very low probability of a reboot or a
permission change.
Given the punt, why isn't there a statement that sched-max-future MUST
NOT be configured for more than some small value (twice the default, or
30 seconds, perhaps), especially while this is targeted for
Experimental? Without something like that, I think the document needs
to talk about more of the issues it is trying to avoid with longer term
scheduling, even if it doesn't solve those issues. (If I have a fast
pipe, I can make a server keep a lot of queued requests, eating a lot
of state, even if the window is only 15 seconds. Pointing to how
netconf protects against state-exhaustion abuse might be useful).
Note that we did not define a maximal value for sched-max-future, since
one of the goals was to define a generic tool that can be used for various
different environments. The draft clearly states the intention of using
near-future-scheduling, but the requirements and constraints of different
environments may require the sched-max-future to have a different value,
potentially higher than 30 seconds. Hence, we prefer not to define a
maximal value. Indeed, in the draft 06 there is a more detailed discussion
about the issues we are trying to prevent by using near-future scheduling
(Section 3.6).
The security considerations section talks about malicious parties
attempting to cause sched-max-future to be configured to "a small
value". Could you more clearly characterize "small", given that the
default is 15 seconds?
Agreed.
We rephrased this paragraph to be more clear about the "small" value:
This YANG module defines <sched-max-future> and <sched-max-past>, which
are writable/creatable/deletable. These data nodes may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. An attacker may
attempt to maliciously configure these parameters to a low value, thereby
causing all scheduled RPCs to be discarded. For instance, if a client
expects <sched-max-future> to be 15 seconds, but in practice it is
maliciously configured to 1 second, then a legitimate scheduled RPC that is
scheduled to be performed 5 seconds in the future will be discarded by the
server.
Even with the near-future limit, there are issues to discuss introduced
with the ability to cancel a request:
* What prevents a 3rd party from cancelling a request? I think it's
only that the 3rd party would have to obtain the right id to put in the
cancel message. If so, the document should talk about how you keep
eavesdroppers from seeing those ids, and that the servers that generate
them should make ids that are hard to guess.
We understand this needs further clarification. As noted by Andy Bierman
in a corresponding mail:
Since the scheduled rpc event is sent to every client that is
listening for notifications, there is no possibility for security
through hard-to-guess token, as is done with the "persist-id" for
cancelling a confirmed-commit.
We rephrased the paragraph to clarify these issues:
This YANG module defines the <cancel-schedule> RPC. This RPC may be
considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. Since the
value of the <schedule-id> is known to all the clients that are subscribed
to notifications from the server, the <cancel-schedule> RPC may be used
maliciously to attack servers by canceling their pending RPCs. This attack
is addressed in two layers: (i) security at the transport layer, limiting
the attack only to clients that have successfully initiated a secure
session with the server, and (ii) the authorization level required to
cancel an RPC should be the same as the level required to schedule it.
* Especially given the near-future limitation, you run a high risk that
the cancel arrives after the identified request has been executed. It's
not clear in the current text what the server should do. I assume you
want the server to reply to the cancel with a "I couldn't cancel that"
rather than to do something like try to undo the request. The document
should be explicit.
* The document should explicitly disallow adding <scheduled-time> to
<cancel-schedule>
Agreed.
We have addressed these two comments by adding the following paragraph:
A cancel-schedule message MUST NOT include the scheduled-time parameter. A
server that receives a cancel-schedule should try to cancel the schedule as
soon as possible. If the server is unable to cancel the scheduled RPC, for
example because it has already been executed, it should respond with an
rpc-error [RFC6241], in which the error-type is 'protocol', and the
error-tag is 'operation-failed'.
One editorial comment: It would help to move the concept of the
near-future limitation much earlier in the document, perhaps even into
the introduction and abstract.
Agreed.
We added the following to the introduction:
The NETCONF time capability is intended for scheduling RPCs that should be
performed in the near future, allowing to coordinate simultaneous
configuration changes, or to specify an order of configuration updates.
Time-of-day-based policies and far-future scheduling, e.g., [Cond], are
outside the scope of this memo.
[Cond] Watsen, K., "Conditional Enablement of
Configuration Nodes", draft-kwatsen-conditional-enablement-00 (expired),
2013.
And for the shepherding AD: The document has no shepherd or shepherd
writeup. While a writeup is not required, one would have been useful in
this case to discuss the history of (lack of) discussion of the
document on the group's list and the group's reaction to progressing as
Experimental as an Individual Submission.