Has anyone laid out the perceived dangers in an easily digestible
format? I would be interested to see that discussion.
See the discussion on this list in the first LC. I tried to sum them
up in one message about a week before the end.
Given that the DNS RR in question is something the end user has to
explicitly request, ...
Uh, what? The DNS is under control of the domain owner, not the end
users. If I'm running mitmmail.com, I can publish keys for all of my
users that I can decode on the way in. If I'm that kind of MITM I
might even re-encode the mail with the users' real keys if I know what
they are, perhaps from the traditional PGP key servers.
This points out one of the problems with this draft: there's no
security model beyond the implicit DANE model that anything that's
signed with DNSSEC must be true.
R's,
John