In article <D45CE6A5317D4B373CD90742@PSB> you write:
Victor, Wei Chuang, and IESG,
The more this discussion goes on, the more I become convinced
that this document should make an explicit reference to the IDNA
2008 and SMTPUTF8 documents, say that strings in certificates
MUST conform to whatever is allowed there and then, other than
making a statement about preference for U-labels over A-labels
(or vice versa), say as little as possible. ...
I'd like to endorse John's point -- if these things look like e-mail
addresses, they should *be* e-mail addresses, with the same rules.
Particularly in a security context, we're not doing people any favors
by allowing strings that look almost like addresses but aren't, or
alternate forms where users have to decide whether they're equivalent.
If people want to do experiments with other kinds of names, that
is fine, but they don't go into a standards track document. If
they turn out to be useful, we can add them to the spec later.
R's,
John