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Re: [ietf-dkim] [mail-vet-discuss] ADSP and From header authentication?

2008-10-23 19:47:45

On Oct 23, 2008, at 12:17 PM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

Douglas Otis wrote:
The sender-auth draft provides a mechanism for use when ADSP  
records  are discovered, the From header field can be captured  
within an  Authentication-Results header.  The purpose of the  
Authentication- Results header is to convey to MUAs the results of  
various message  "authentication" checks.  Because the Author- 
Signature definition  limits what is allowed within a compliant  
DKIM signature, neither  ADSP, Sender-ID, or SPF can properly be  
described as providing an  authentication of the From header field,  
PRA, or the MAILFROM email- address respectively.  The Author- 
Signature definition prevents a  complaint signature  "on-behalf- 
of" value from indicating a From  header field has not been  
authenticated.

I'm afraid I'm missing how the definition of Author-Signature, which  
is a property of the ADSP specification, alters what SPF or Sender- 
ID can claim.

This draft incorrectly describes methods as offering  
"authentication".  Unfortunately, this mischaracterization also  
includes DKIM-ADSP because of the broken Author-Signature definition.

In addition, the path registration process of Sender-ID and SPF  
only  authorize an SMTP client.  An authorized SMTP client will not  
safely  convey an assurance that the corresponding email-address  
was  authenticated to represent the author or even being a valid  
use of the  email-address.

A consumer of the data presented in this header field would be  
expected to understand what an SPF "pass" or Sender-ID "pass"  
actually implies before acting on it.  There's text covering that in  
the draft already as well, in the "Header Position and  
Interpretation" section.


A security mechanism should not recklessly abuse the term  
Authentication.  The term Authentication is _dangerously_ misleading  
for most methods logged by this header.  The term "Authentication"  
should be replaced by a neutral term "method" within draft where  
possible.  It would not be too misleading to use the terms  
"Authentication or Authorization" instead of just "Authentication"  
within a few sentences.   A header label "Source-Results"  would be  
less deceptive in respect to the nature of the results obtained.  The  
term Authentication is being misused more than 60 times through out  
this draft (ignoring the title and header labels).  Admittedly the  
word "authorized" is buried in the definition of some results,  but  
this term will _never_ be evident to the user.  Do you see the danger  
using the header label "Authentication-Results:"?  The draft's  
introductory statement does not help much either:

"At the time of publication of this draft, [AUTH], [DKIM],  
[DOMAINKEYS], [SENDERID] and [SPF] are the published e-mail  
authentication methods in common use."

Authentication methods?  Really?

It is _dangerous_ and _misleading_ to suggest that an SMTP client  
_authorization_ method results in the "authentication" of the PRA,  
MAILFROM, the valid origination of the message as stated in this  
draft.  An _unauthorized_ SMTP client MAY be an indication of the  
invalid use of a MAILFROM or PRA,  however an authorized SMTP client  
must not be assumed to indicate the valid use of an email-address, as  
suggested by the overused term "Authentication" through out this  
draft.  Describing an authorization method as being an authentication  
method results in a dangerous misrepresentation of the results  
produced for most of the methods currently defined methods, even for  
DKIM-ADSP at this time.

Get rid of the sales hype describing everything as "authentication".   
Security is no time for muddled or misused terminology.  There is no  
reason to mislead recipient any more than they already are.

-Doug









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