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Re: [mail-vet-discuss] Straw consensus call on auth-header draft

2008-10-23 21:05:27

On Oct 23, 2008, at 11:49 AM, Murray S. Kucherawy wrote:

Douglas Otis wrote:
The ADSP draft inhibits an assurance regarding _what_ the signing  
domain authenticated!  The Author Signature definition limits a  
signing-domain's associated "on-behalf-of" identifier to being an  
email address within the From header field or to being _blank_.     
As a result, any intra-domain abuse can not be safely identified.    
One would be mistaken to assume the From email-address is always  
what a signing domain authenticates.  No other assumption would be  
available without incurring an impractical second signature that is  
likely ignored anyway.  Should one care about the damage created by  
an incorrect assumption regarding authentication, even when the  
assumption is signed by the border MTA?  Perhaps this could be call  
the Assumed-Authentication-Results header. : )

-Doug

Doug,

I'm pretty sure you're talking about the reliability/assertions of  
ADSP or even DKIM.  That's orthogonal to what we're discussing here  
on mail-vet-discuss.  This draft is about moving the evaluation  
results from an MTA to MUAs in a consistent and reliable manner.   
That the evaluations themselves could conceivably be flawed or  
subverted is already discussed in Security Considerations for this  
draft and is not within the scope of this document.

I responded to a different message on mail-vet and dkim.  Here is the  
portion that attempts to explain the concern:

A security mechanism should not recklessly abuse the term  
Authentication.  The term Authentication is _dangerously_ misleading  
for most methods logged by this header.  The term "Authentication"  
should be replaced by a neutral term "method" within draft where  
possible.  It would not be too misleading to use the terms   
"Authentication or Authorization" instead of just "Authentication"   
within a few sentences.   A header label "Source-Results"  would be  
less deceptive in respect to the nature of the results obtained.  The  
term Authentication is being misused more than 60 times through out  
this draft (ignoring the title and header labels).  Admittedly the  
word "authorized" is buried in the definition of some results,  but   
this term will _never_ be evident to the user.  Do you see the danger  
using the header label "Authentication-Results:"?  The draft's  
introductory statement does not help much either:

"At the time of publication of this draft, [AUTH], [DKIM],   
[DOMAINKEYS], [SENDERID] and [SPF] are the published e-mail  
authentication methods in common use."

Authentication methods?  Really?

It is _dangerous_ and _misleading_ to suggest that an SMTP client  
_authorization_ method results in the "authentication" of the PRA,  
MAILFROM, the valid origination of the message as stated in this  
draft.  An _unauthorized_ SMTP client MAY be an indication of the  
invalid use of a MAILFROM or PRA,  however an authorized SMTP client  
must not be assumed to indicate the valid use of an email-address, as  
suggested by the overused term "Authentication" through out this   
draft.  Describing an authorization method as being an authentication  
method results in a dangerous misrepresentation of the results  
produced for most of the methods currently defined, even for DKIM-ADSP  
at this time.

Get rid of the sales hype describing everything as "authentication".   
Security is no time for muddled or misused terminology.  There is no  
reason to mislead recipients any more than they already are.

-Doug

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