On Friday 30 January 2004 8:42 pm, Hallam-Baker, Phillip wrote:
Have you considered the liabilities that you might incur if you
sponsor (accredit) a peer?
I have considered them to be zero given that the only semantic for a peer link
is "This guy is my buddy; I want his behaviour to reflect on me in your
scoring algorithm"
Could work, maybe. Why expose the raw data and have every leaf analyse?
Checking an accreditation works out as one or two exists-like lookups per
return-path presented to it in most common cases (assuming sensible caching)
In most common cases the accreditation path would be short, eg:
retail user -> ISP -> Accreditation Authority (AA)
corporate user -> Corporation -> Accreditation Authority (AA)
vanity domain owner -> Registrar -> Accreditation Authority (AA)
I imagine the AA's would roughly match today's PKI CA's.
Nope, you can use any authentication scheme you like. You just
use SPF as a policy statement describing the authentication and
accreditation steps you took.
Why? It's not an authentication issue?
I certainly do not want multiple policy languages. How can I
say 'all mail is authenticated by X or Y' otherwise?
You can't, it's relativistic.
The accreditation scheme is not contentious amongst the ISPs.
I guess they would be happy to see the little guy squeezed out? *I* find that
contentious!
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