I've stayed out of this discussion so far, because my opinion has already been
noted, but since you've changed the subject...
On Jan 27, 2010, at 12:50 AM, Kemp, David P. wrote:
Yes. I agree that SCSV could be defined to convey only 1 bit of
information while RI conveys 2 bits, and agree that -01 (which went
through last call) does not define it that way.
What I don't understand is why the issue of changing the semantics of
-01 and -03 to reflect a "1 bit SCSV" is so #$%& important.
1. It is trivially easy to code to either version.
Actually it's easier to hard-code the ciphersuite list on the client, because
it never changes with most applications. Adding logic to differentiate between
initial handshakes and repeated handshakes complicates the code (though not by
much)
2. There is no security impact of using either version.
3. It is easier to articulate and to understand an "identical" soundbite
than to explain how SCSV and empty RI are semantically different, and
"SCSV means the client supports RI". There. That was easy to articulate. An
empty extension is less easy IMO.
4. The "identical" version is ready to go, in the form of -03 that can
be published as an RFC right now.
And this would be very important, if the world was holding its breath waiting
for RI. I think it will take several years before RI is really deployed in a
useful way, so I don't agree that spending a few more weeks getting it right is
wrong because we have to publish this thing "now"
And although I hesitate to bring up the following since they are
non-essential,
5. SCSV is a hack meant to appease ancient and/or non-conforming
servers. That is one ugly baby, and I wish it would just disappear.
There is absolutely no reason for it ever to be sent in a ClientHello
containing a non-empty RI (it is a no-op that just wastes N bits of
bandwidth to convey 0 bits of additional information, and no legacy
implementation would ever send or interpret it), so I see absolutely no
downside to prohibiting it during renegotiation.
To me RI looks like a hack just as much as SCSV. Hopefully in the future, the
way to indicate support for secure renegotiation would be in the client version
of the ClientHello.
6. Reducing optional elements is always good security hygiene (hash
collision space, covert channels, stack overflow alignment, etc.) Take
away a useless knob and nobody can twiddle that knob against you.
Dave
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