On Sat, Apr 12, 2014 at 4:35 PM, <ned+ietf(_at_)mauve(_dot_)mrochek(_dot_)com>
wrote:
The underlying technical issue is that the two technologies DMARC is built
on -
DKIM and SPF - both attach additional/restrictive semantics to
longstanding mail
system fields. (Broadly speaking, From: for DKIM and MAIL FROM for SPF.)
Something's amiss here. What new semantics does DKIM attach to From:? As
far as I know, it only requires that the field be signed. It doesn't
require that it be interpreted in a particular way or that it contain any
particular value.
It goes on to discuss the use of p=reject with domains that only send
transactional. AFAICT there is no discussion of when *not* to use
p=reject, and
why. Nor, for that matter is there substantive discussion of mailing_list,
and why it's not a general solution to the problems caused by p=reject.
Yes, that's useful advice for a future revision.
Like it or not, the IETF published a draft that defines certain mechanisms
which, if used improperly by a large provider, cause serious problems for a
large number of people. The text describing the consequences of the use of
those mechansisms in the drafts is, IMO, entirely inadequate.
It's the same document that was posted on other web sites for some time,
and was in use by a number of operators (including Yahoo) long before it
went into the datatracker.
As it's only a draft, there's ample opportunity to make such improvements.
Also: By "the IETF published a draft", are you talking about an RFC, or the
DMARC base draft? It seems extreme to lay blame on the IETF in general
merely for having an open mechanism by which to post a draft for all to see
and discuss. A "Request For Comment", as it were. Are you suggesting that
process should be closed or moderated somehow?
And it's not like we didn't know. As others have pointed out, this issue
existed in the earlier ADSP proposal. It was given insufficient attention
there
as well.
As with any draft, its content is only as good as its contributions and the
reviews it got.
Of course the IETF can fall back on the usual excuses, including, but not
limited to:
Yahoo, of all ISPs, should have known better
We don't tell people what to do
It was just a draft
It was never intended to be a standard
We're not the Internet Protocol Police
etc.
I'm sorry, but this time none of these dogs are hunting for me. An
attractive
nuisance is an attractive nuisance, and this is what the IETF has, albeit
with
the best of intentions, managed to create.
I would add to this that, by its ultimate inaction in the face of a
protracted period of abuse and attempts by participants to solve that
problem within its procedures, the IETF has abdicated any authority it may
have had.
The real question we should be discussing is what options the IETF has to
try
and address this.
I certainly agree with that.
-MSK