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Re: [Asrg] Maintaining Anonymity in an Authenticated System

2003-07-03 05:57:36
Quoting Spencer Dawkins <spencer(_at_)mcsr-labs(_dot_)org>:

[deleted down to]


Anonymous transmission is indeed a feature of our current systems,
not a bug.  Any new system or authentication layer on top of what
already exists needs to maintain that.

As I understand it, most of the proposals of that nature are about
tying messages to a specific e-mail address. Just because you can trace a
message back to a certain address does not necessarily mean you can
identify the human being who sent it.

Ya know, I understand what you're saying, but (1) we're going
through an IPv6 exercise to say "well, maybe MAC addresses
are too closely tied to people to use them as part of
autoconfigured IPv6 addresses"

That's an interesting point in itself. Tracing a MAC address (or an IPv6 
address derived from one) could allow an eavesdropper to trace traffic from 
multiple connection sessions (over a period of time) back to a single network 
interface.

Of course there still isn't necessarily a one-to-one mapping between a network 
interface and a human being. NAT gateways can hide many machines and people 
behind them, and of course even a single machine may have multiple people who 
log on and use it.

The shortage of IPv4 addresses has lead to mechanisms like DHCP and NAT, both 
of which can provide limited levels of privacy... This issue intrigues me a lot 
but I won't say too much else about it here for fear of getting wildly off-
topic.

(2) for most users of
personal computers, saying "someone else must have broken
into my house and sent all this child porn from my PC" has not
been observed to work very well, and (3) in order to say
"IP addresses != people", you would need dynamic IP
addresses that don't tie to NAIs, etc. - I believe all the IP
addresses I use for POP3/SMTP can be traced back to
me pretty easily... if I was a charter member of al Queda
I'd be more motivated to hide, but I don't think anonymous
POP3/SMTP is as easy as you're making it sound.

Well, maybe I glibly made it sound easy. My example deliberately bypassed the 
need for POP3 by using a webmail interface to access a mailbox that way.

My point was simply that, whatever new e-mail system is developed in future, if 
access to it can be proxied in some way (via a web interface or otherwise) then 
IP address tracing would turn up at a dead end.

We should of course consider privacy as a requirement, but one needn't define 
it as an explicit part of a new e-mail system provided some external anonymity 
protection method is compatible with it - or at least new ideas shouldn't 
preclude some kind of anonymity even if they don't actually define a mechanism 
for it.
 
By "anonymous", I'm talking about two-way communication -
more than just sending an e-mail from Bill Gates saying "I'm
really excited about this quarter's earnings prospects". Simple
forgery is, of course, a variant of one-way anonymous communication.

That's a good reminder, thanks for that.

OK, suppose there were a tracked, secure version of Hotmail (say) whose 
messages could always be traced back to my Hotmail e-mail address, I could 
still use an anonymous web proxy service to both send and receive messages on 
that account.

That way, if I sent spam, my account could still be closed by MSN for violation 
of their abuse policy. But anyone with a personal or political grudge against 
me would not be able to trace the e-mail address to me as an individual.

Would that work? (Once again I assume that I would lie to Hotmail about any 
personal details they ask for, since it would be difficult for them to check at 
the time of sign-up)

I do take your point about the ease of setting this up. However it would create 
a nice market for companies to provide proxying to common webmail services. 
They could let me log in at their website and proxy on my behalf to Hotmail (or 
whoever), passing the results back to my browser. To average Joe Public it 
could be made very easy to use by being almost totally transparent and it would 
make a nice business opportunity for companies to rent such services to people.

Now, this is fairly true, but is anonymity via webmail sufficient?

It's difficult to say. On the technical side, with only access to the IP 
address of my proxy and my message itself it might still be possible to 
identify me by my apparent relationship with those I contact. Then again, it 
might still be possible to do so if I wrote a letter to someone.

If I were really paranoid I'd use something like public key cryptography and 
send my messages that way. Whether webmail companies would provide that service 
for free is another matter. Certainly having a protocol which sends e-mail over 
encrypted connections between MTAs might help stop eavesdroppers en route from 
intercepting my message. The technology to do that is readily available.

One issue is that if courts could order anonymiser services to surrender their 
logs then that might be a problem. However jurisdiction would likely rest with 
the country in which the server is based. Indeed, some countries might do a 
nice trade in off-shore privacy proxies (just as Switzerland does with banking 
privacy). I'm not a lawyer however, so I'll leave it to the legal experts to 
determine the risks of that one.

Is any of this helpful? Personally I'll always be paranoid about communications 
privacy, but I happen to believe that low-level paranoia is a survival skill. :-
)

Andrew

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