Alan DeKok wrote:
------- Forwarded Message
From: "Alan DeKok" <aland(_at_)freeradius(_dot_)org>
To: asrg(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: Re: [Asrg] 7a: To consent, or not to consent
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Sat, 30 Aug 2003 22:25:31 +0200."
<a06001a88bb76b751470d(_at_)[10(_dot_)0(_dot_)1(_dot_)2]>
Message-Id: <E19uCzt-0007ze-00(_at_)mail(_dot_)nitros9(_dot_)org>
Brad Knowles <brad(_dot_)knowles(_at_)skynet(_dot_)be> wrote:
You now have a choice:
a) establish a framework so that every party to those email
messages has sufficient information to verify (at some level)
that the other parties have consented to the email being sent.
(end user, ISP, MTA's, sender, recipient, etc.)
b) decide that's too complicated, and avoid communicating consent.
The first choice involves re-designing the Internet from scratch (by
some accounts), and will cost billions of dollars, and take decades to
implement. The second choice involves keeping the status quo, in
which case we've decided to NOT fight spammers, and ASRG should
therefore be disbanded.
I sincerely hope there are other alternatives.
------- End of Forwarded Message
Here's an alternative:
(c) 1. Establish a framework for end-to-end consent negotiation.
2. As an optimization for performance and division of labor,
support some mechanisms for communicating consent information
from the recipient to enterprise or ISP systems with more
bandwidth or computational power.
Trying to build a framework that every mail-handling party hooks
into is a chimera chase. Not only is it too complex, it also opens
up whole new messy opportunities for DoS attacks upon the framework
itself.
End-to-end is sufficient but may bottleneck.
Limited delegation and information sharing fixes the bottlenecks,
and requires connectivity and information sharing only between
parties that can arrange their own contractual and performance
expectations.
Any more than that is mostly cost and little benefit.
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