On Jan 23, 2006, at 9:25 AM, Peter J. Holzer wrote:
Russ' Scheme gets around this problem but at the cost of
potentially being much more annoying to forgery victims.
(I guess that it could be combined with SPF or DKIM to give victims
an easy way to avoid being ddossed)
DKIM is not related to the return-path and is not expected to survive
within a DSN. Although often less, SPF has a required minimum of
more than hundred lookups and then _may_ be related to either return-
path or the PRA. SPF may produce erroneous results in some cases,
such as when applied to the PRA or 1123 5.3.6(a). SPF may provide
open-ended authorizations to enable alternative providers which
perhaps also attracts abuse at the same time. Another potential
problem occurs when SPF is considered a verification of email-address
to justify the accrual of reputation, which is dangerous in most
shared environments.
BATV, much like VERP, offers a solution for preventing any "back-
scatter" problem from affecting the users. The handful of packets
exchanged offers protection, and is better than delivering a bogus
message. This overhead is not that much worse than using a block-
list and returning an error-message indicating which list caused the
rejection.
http://mipassoc.org/batv/
http://cr.yp.to/proto/verp.txt
-Doug
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