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Re: [Asrg] Supplemental addresses (was: Indirection as a useful tool)

2006-02-07 12:03:39
I wrote:
All mail into and out of the enterprise is configured to pass through the 
system as a gateway.  On the
way out, the system determines, based on a fairly large number of criteria, 
which supplemental address
(es)  (if any) are to be used or whether a new one is to be created.  All 
references to the original, 
"internal" address are replaced in the header, body and certain attachments 
with the "correct" 
supplemental  address before delivery to the recipient.
 
On replies and messages sent back, the process is reversed.
 
Brian wrote:
Isn't this (an over engineered) auto-whitelist?
 
Brian

Quite the contrary.  I understand that this approach might appear similar to 
white listing in that managing supplemental addresses requires correlating the 
identity of outside correspondents to supplemental addresses. However, white 
listing has the net effect of encouraging dialogue to a single address, which 
is the opposite of the goal of using supplemental addresses.  From a purely 
theoretical point of view, the goal of using supplemental addresses is to get 
people to use as many different addresses as possible, although in reality this 
does not take place.  In practice, certain addresses are used by multiple 
correspondents -- creating "communities" of correspondents that are implicitly 
and explicitly accumulated.  Some users employ only one or a few supplemental 
addresses because that's how they want to use the technology.  Still others 
don't want to use them, but still need spam relief, so all of these conditions 
must be satisfied.

As to the level of engineering, if you set out to build a system that employed 
supplemental addresses, managed which addresses required a security pass, and 
kept track of which correspondents used which supplemental addresses, the level 
of engineering would find itself.

Add a few additional requirements that we observed in implementation:

1) Address management must be transparent to the end user

2) Outside contacts must be insulated from any aggravation during the adoption 
by new users

3) Users must be able to employ the system with no little or no change in 
behavior and no training

I agree that the engineering isn't trivial.  However, I am certain that many of 
the content filtering services have vastly more sophisticated technology than 
what is required to support supplemental addresses.  The hard part is working 
out all the subtleties when you actually get a diverse and large group of users 
while maintaining transparency for users.

The model holds up over time, and serves as a complementary and additive 
technique to any other email security approach.  It is liberating, as more and 
more legitimate mail is kept from having to run the rapids of any security 
scrutiny that might mistakenly block or delay delivery.

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