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Re: [Asrg] Re: Asrg Digest, DNSBL BCP v.2.0

2007-03-02 23:54:59
Bill,

Thank you for the very insightful rebuttal to many of my arguments.

Bill Cole wrote:
At 11:19 PM -0500 3/2/07, Stephanie Erin Daugherty wrote:

I'll agree that its a horrible idea. At one point, a DNSBL could effectively stop a lot of spam. Now, most DNSBL operators and DNSBL users have realized that the technology long ago ceased to be useful in stopping all but the most persistent and long-lived spam sources, and compromised hosts.

That is not consistent with the evidence I have on hand.

I deal with multiple receiving sites (corporate and microdomain) and know of none where the CBL fails to reject over 2/3 of all SMTP connections or has ever had a detectable false positive rate greater than 1 per million rejections over a period of over a month, with the false positives coming in very brief episodes (commonly describable as the consequences of ill-considered NAT designs.) For most sites, the reject rate is usually in the 75-80%.

My experience has been different, but then I'm not administering mail for a corporation or major provider either, so my experiences may not match yours. My own, admittedly non-scientific, findings have been that the more sophisticated spammers use compromised hosts almost immediately after they are compromised, or make multiple brute force attempts via various compromised hosts until they find one that's allowed to connect.
I think that's an appealing story that does not always describe reality. I know there are some providers who respond to listings, but there are some who simply don't, and are unimpeded by that for years. The entity formerly known as UUNet (finally seeming to clean up a bit since the VZ acquisition,) the 'new' AT&T (i.e. SBC,) Comcast, and the Chinese Internet oligopoly seem impervious to the supposed business impact of DNSBL's.

Unfortunately, it doesn't always work, but systematically escalating a listing after each successive effort to negotiate with a provider has gotten the attention of some of these large providers in the past. Unfortunately, this is a big sharp stick that loses it's effectiveness every time it's used - as many mail administrators will usually locally white list any major provider that's blocked by a DNSBL they use, or will stop using a DNSBL that's willing to block major providers.

However, when this is judiciously applied, and coupled with pressure from the provider's own customers, it can work and has worked, at least to a degree, but it's a very extreme measure that can only be used in very extreme circumstances without major loss of a DNSBL's credibility (and therefore it's effectiveness).

Spews (IANS) was somewhat limited in this regard, because although they were willing to escalate listings, they had such a reputation for doing so that most of it's users were hardcore spamfighters anyway, and not large mail sites.

The UDP worked better when it was applied than anything in email can because the news network is built on a fundamental building block of explicit and strictly bilateral agreements to pass traffic. Sites that have agreements with everyone they accept mail from don't have major spam problems.

You may have hit the nail on the head here as to why current solutions aren't working that well, and maybe that's an approach we should strive for - an email system built on consensual agreements.

--Stephanie


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