Hi Jim,
Jim Fenton wrote:
Jim Fenton wrote:
I have been planning on a minor revision of the threat document
before the revised draft cutoff (Oct 24), but can do something more
aggressive if it's a real improvement that will move us closer to
chartering.
So I would like a reading from Russ as to whether he views the
structure you propose as an improvement, and whether the current
structure is adequate, before making a sweeping change such as this.
That's a fair question. Though I'm not sure if Russ is listening here
right now.
>
Please, let's ask.
So that's clear now (and good too!). Would you now agree that if
we include the the threat analysis RFC as a milestone then the
restructuring makes sense? (Honestly - I believe you'll end up
with less work and not more.)
Agree that the vulnerability is in scope (although IMO a little
far-fetched, given the timing uncertainties of sending a message through
an MTA.) And agree that this belongs in the security considerations
section of the base proposal. What isn't clear to me is why the same
thing needs to appear in both the threat analysis and the base
document. As it stands, the threat analysis mentions three important
threats, and refers the reader to the security considerations section of
the base document for more. Isn't it sufficient to have it in one place?
Possibly. I'd prefer to see all the threat analysis in one document or
at least all we can do before the protocol is finalised, which in this
case is a lot.
My reasons:-
- makes it easier to argue that the threat analysis is
complete/good/etc.
- the putative section 4 gives us a good & easy way to check that
the base protocol (& ssp etc) conform to the conculsions reached
during the threat analysis (or else show us that we need to rethink
something)
The sec. cons. of the base document can reference that or repeat text
as appropriate. I don't see problems doing that, but can understand
your preference. Others?
Stephen.
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