On October 25, 2005 at 16:20, Jim Fenton wrote:
That would be a step backwards, with more than one From address
there must be a single Sender address. Not necessarily one of
the From-addresses, it can be even different from the envelope.
That's exactly the problem. Sender isn't visible to the recipient with
many of today's MUAs.
IMHO any design and policy decisions that rely on particular MUA
rendering behaviors is a mistake.
Has it been considered that DKIM be modified to allow the signer
to specify which originating address it is binding to? This way, a
signer can bind to Sender, From, Resent-Sender, etc. The SSP check
and verification would then be based which OA field is specified in
the sig.
An example of how this is useful is for mailing lists. Mailing lists
that change the Sender can bind its signature to it, independent of
what is in the From and avoiding any restrictions on From's SSP.
It can also address the problem of Resent-* scenarios.
Of course, verification results displayed to the end-user is important
(in general) to avoid confusion on the end-user's part on what has
been verified.
For example, a malicious domain could still bind a sig to Sender
and use a From address belonging to another domain. Therefore,
verification results should not indicate any "validity" about From,
only Sender.
--ewh
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