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Re: [ietf-dkim] New Issue: Base: Upgrade indication and protection against downgrade attacks

2006-02-15 10:54:20

On Feb 15, 2006, at 9:06 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:



Dave Crocker wrote:

DKIM already permits specifying different algorithms. If you are suggesting that it needs to do more than that, to anticipate some requirement that might be imposed 5 years from now, please elaborate.

Its neither that vague, nor that frightening. NIST will end up organising a competition for a new hash algorithm - they've nearly said as much already. When that's done, the winner will be a FIPS and will be the algorithm of choice. That's likely to take a few years, but probably not 10, IMO.

The point is that when the DKIM RFC is about 2-3 years old, there'll likely be a different preferred algorithm and we should (now) try to make that transition as easy as we can, so long as it doesn't hold us up too much. But, if we do a good job on the sha-1/ sha-256 issue now, I'd hope that should be enough.

Of equal concern with respect to crypto-security, support for 500-bit keys should be dropped.

-Doug
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