RE: SSP RR vs TXT [was Re: [ietf-dkim] SSP and o= values]

> From: Hector Santos [mailto:hsantos(_at_)santronics(_dot_)com] 
> Follow the MARID May/2004 "Wild Card MXes" Thread at:
>
> http://www.mhonarc.org/archive/html/ietf-mxcomp/2004-05/msg00504.html
> http://www.mhonarc.org/archive/html/ietf-mxcomp/2004-05/msg00461.html
>
> Bob Atkinson seems to explain in detail.
Olafur and co are much better at demanding data from others than providing
it themselves.

My bigger complaint here is that this is one case where we know that
significant deployment problems are being swept under the carpet. This calls
into question their claims with respect to UNIX deployment of BIND. 

Experience on the phishing side of the house strongly suggests that there
are a lot of very old BIND servers out there. 

If people write a spec that does not make explicit description of how an
extension mechanism should work and provide detailed implementation guidance
to ensure interoperability they should not be allowed to later claim that
this is the only conceivable, only allowable extension mechanism for the
protocol. 

If DKIM deploys then DNSSEC will be pulled along in its wake which in turn
will drag deployment of the extension mechanism. Making deployment of the
extension mechanism a necessary deployment condition creates a cycle of
ungranted requests, in other words a deadlock.

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