[ietf-dkim] draft-dkim-pcon
2006-06-15 15:34:20
Use of wildcards for locating policy records is reminiscent of
concepts applied to the then (barely used) TXT resource records, but
now it is the (barely used) PTR resource record. Wildcards have
limitations necessitating inordinate replication at every instance of
an existing name. A common policy record used with many applications
also seems unlikely to fit within a 512 byte DNS message constraint,
and imposing a linking script is highly reckless from a security
standpoint. It seems a new policy service is really needed, rather
than new DNS policy resource records or new methods for handling
wildcards. What existing server would be suitable? LDAPv3 (RFC3377)
referenced from the email-address domain SRV record?
DKIM provides a valuable service without attempting to accommodate
per-user policies via DNS. The down-grade attack affecting S/MIME et
al, can be avoided by incorporating a version "deprecation" ('d')
flag. Lists of trusted signing domains replace a need to separately
discover a less meaningful domain policy records. Bad actors are
just as capable at publishing policy records. A trusted list avoids
look-alike domain attacks and excessive traffic hunting for
sporadically published records. Trusted list also offer a safe basis
for annotating messages. It seems that mechanisms for accessing
trusted lists (an element or extension of the address book) within
applications protocols such as IMAP would be more productive
extending the value of the DKIM signature.
-Doug
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