DKIM is too complicated as it is, and it strikes me as an extremely poor
idea to add yet more cruft to work around perverse situations that are as
yet (and probably always) entirely hypothetical.
I don't understand what "cruft" you think I'm talking about.
Telling people that it is reasonable to add a chain of A-R headers to
messages with broken signatures, and expecting recipients to apply some
ill defined algorithm to decide how much they believe each level of
alleged signature.
I would really like to remove l= from DKIM to make it clear that it is not
a good idea to even try to guess the history of a message based on
signatures that don't verify and cover the whole messag.
R's,
John
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