Hi,
Werner Koch <wk(_at_)gnupg(_dot_)org> writes:
On Mon, 1 Sep 2014 15:13, derek(_at_)ihtfp(_dot_)com said:
RFC4880 already says that that the User Attribute Packet should be treated
the same as the User ID Packet and can be used in all the places that a
User ID Packet can be used. I'm just trying to add a place where you
Alright. I was in GnuPG and not in standard mode. GnuPG skips the
attribute packets for trust computations because it would be surprising
if your key is valid because someone signed you photo and you don't even
see your photo on the command line. We may need to reconsider this if
people start using the WoT based on your new user ID attribute.
I added this text:
Note that RFC 4880 already allows an User Attribute packet anywhere
a User ID packet can be used. See RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.19
(Primary User ID) for more information on self-signatures over these
kinds of packets. Any signature on a User Attribute packet covers
all subpackets. Implementations MAY decide to trust the User ID
Subpacket.
I'm not sure how it would get confused, but I'm not tied to "vers". I'll
For example, we have a "Version:" armor header and "vers" looks like
some kind of abbreviation. Right, they have technically nothing in
common but the notation will be listed and the armor headers may also be
noticed by the user. No big deal, though.
Let me think more on this as I revise the draft. I'll get another copy
out later today.
Salam-Shalom,
Werner
-derek
--
Derek Atkins 617-623-3745
derek(_at_)ihtfp(_dot_)com www.ihtfp.com
Computer and Internet Security Consultant
_______________________________________________
openpgp mailing list
openpgp(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp