At 17:01 07/11/03, Alex Rousskov wrote:
Moreover, concluding now will most likely mean death to the protocol,
tracing, and language work we have already done, at least as far as
IETF is concerned. Such forceful death would be unacceptable to me,
given the effort and already achieved results. A good time to kill
OPES has passed.
I wish the group had more active participants. However, (a) the number
of active participants is not as relevant as the results we are able
to produce (so we should concentrate on evaluating results rather than
mailing list volume) and (b) I expect noticeable increase in OPES
interest once we start marketing our results (and now we actually have
something to show people).
I could not dedicate time to the OPES efort enought nor to come with
example enough lately because of hard time to fight for other concepts
and financiing needs. My be this will have a break and sometimes a
financing. So, I start seeing all this work as a "user" of it.
My first suggestion would be a summary. A book on OPES. Not only
to specify it, but to explain it. This would may be increase the number
of interested people and inputs. It might also help to put everything
in perspective in a real environment.
For example I am extremely interested in OPES and SMTP as I
advance on the definition and operational demands for "weemail"
(yet only in French at http://weemail.org). The idea is to use SMTP
only to carry message pointers and open header information. Mails
stay at the author mail server and is read on an as requested basis.
Great for speed and bandwidth.
Any messaging service can be used to carry that "weeheader"
(SMS, telephone, fax, written mail, radio, Teletex, etc...). This
approach looks like simplifing spamming; but puts it very unatease
as the message must be retrieved at a stable disclosed URL and
additionnal information in the header make it very easy to put
spam at such a low reading priority that it will not hurt. In this
architecture weemail policing would be brillantly supported by
OPES (if I have authorithy I could use OPES to kill access
to spam from all my domain people, in dynamilcally adding a
filtering rule: every weemail or retreiving request at a given URL
would be killed or reported as spam)
This is my ONES issue again. The future of the network is
necessarily ONES (look at VISA which nearly went broke last
week because as a ONES VISA froze 15 years ago and has
not conceptually built on its ONES to the users architecture.
Until IETF and IAB start modelzing a little bit the real network
or the NGN takes over, OPES are the next thing to ONES
we may have. Freezing OPES now would be a mistake.
Thak you Alex for all the work achieved.
But I do think again that a book explaining it would help
every one. Starting with you?
jfc