On Wed, 11 Aug 2010, ned+ietf-smtp(_at_)mrochek(_dot_)com wrote:
"Long delays after the <CRLF>.<CRLF> is received can
result in timeouts and duplicate messages. Deferring
detailed message analysis until after the SMTP
connection has closed can result in non-delivery
notifications, possibly sent to incorrect addresses. A
receiver-SMTP MUST carefully balance these two
considerations, i.e., the time required to respond to
the final <CRLF>.<CRLF> end of data indicator and the
desirable goal of rejecting undeliverable or
unacceptable messages at SMTP time."
I like this text. I think it reflects current operational realities quite
I agree. The only suggestion I have is that an informational referenece to
Craig Partridge's oringal document on the timeout issue might be helpful to
include after the first sentence.
Yes. Maybe also add to the second sentence a cross-reference to section
7.1 on spoofing?