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Re: Any interest in rigorous definition for SSL certificate verification in SMTP?

2011-11-14 19:40:04

On 14/11/2011 22:40, Carl S. Gutekunst wrote:
Dave CROCKER wrote:
On 11/15/2011 4:10 AM, Carl S. Gutekunst wrote:
The purpose is to define a standard way for an SMTP sender (client) to determine that the SMTP receiver that it's talking to is the one it thinks it's talking
to. The mechanism would detect man-in-the-middle attacks and connection
hijacking at either the routing or DNS level.

Isn't that exactly the problem that the DANE working group attacking.

DANE is looking at DNSSEC extensions, which may well be what Tony was looking for.

However, one of the references for DANE -- RFC 6125 -- seems to be exactly what I was looking for. Unfortunately, it very deliberately codifies the language from RFC 2818 for wildcards, with the established practice for SMTP being a SHOULD NOT.
Backward compatibility might be a sufficient reason to violate the SHOULD NOT.
I'll have to figure out what to do about that. (That said, I can count the number of MTA implementations that support wildcard domains in certificates without taking off my shoes.)



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