Sunday, Nov 29, 2015 11:28 PM John Levine wrote:
Yes. See the message you just replied to.
The experience you related sounds like hobbyist activity, no offense. I can't
see how what you described could possibly scale to anything a large email
provider would ever do, and indeed it's not something I would ever take the
trouble to do, even though my domain has exactly two users. If I get spam, I
delete it. I do not complain about it. I do not attempt to understand where
it originated.
Since the only header-field you can actually trust is the first one that your
own MTA adds, ...
No, that's not correct. See recent message.
I saw the recent message, and again, what you described is something that
doesn't scale. If that is your model for how header-field messages are used
for validation, I think what I said is actually more generally accurate. Do
you seriously think that Google has special-case header parsing to deal with
spam from Cornell students' infected computers? No, they just use machine
learning.
SPF works just as well (actually, a _lot_ better) as a validation mechanism.
What? Header chains say "this message came through this IP". SPF
says "I assert that these IPs are allowed to send mail for this
domain." They're completely unrelated.
SPF allows me to discard all messages that claim to be from domain X but come
from IP addresses not listed for domain X, which means that I never have to
write a Received: header for that message. If there is no SPF for the domain
that sent the message, I would like to just discard it as spam, but that's not
safe to do because so many small sites don't implement SPF or get it wrong.
But in any case where there is no SPF record, the site is definitely not
trustworthy: I cannot rely on the Received: header fields it included in the
message. And if the site _is_ trustworthy, then modulo a few small exceptions
like Cornell, it's not originating anything that can be reasonably identified
as spam, because if it could have been reasonably identified as spam, it would
never have been forwarded. So I can't see how the experiences you are
describing would motivate the inclusion of something like an unobfuscated
Received: header field across organizational boundaries if SMTP were being
designed today.
We don't use header chains for validation, we use it to figure out who
to blame, who to alert, and who to block.
I don't know who "we" is here. Is this really how Google, et al., operate?
It sounds like something people like you and me used to do ten years ago, that
some of us old-timers are still doing (I only stopped using spamassassin
recently, for example). I would be okay with being proven wrong, but the fact
that you are still doing this isn't persuasive to me.
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