I'm a nasty and motivated attacker who has compromised part of
either your LAN or the WAN ...
If you want a cert bound to that address,
I can make one up and send it to you.
Now, one could further harden that by making DNS records that
identified, e.g., the CA that would be required to sign any
certs or records from the address. My skimming of 7672 suggests
it doesn't go that far.
Ah, but it does. That's what the TLSA record is. It has too many options
(being after all a recent product of the IETF) but it can contain a hash
of the certificate itself, or a hash of the CA signing certificate that
the SMTP server has to offer when it does the STARTTLS.
Experience with the variable quality of coordination and cooperation
between mail server operators and DNS operators in organizations large
enough to have them be separate functions suggests that level of linkage
will lead to a lot of false negatives and unnecessary rejections, but
maybe that is a different matter.
I wouldn't disagree, but if you want a path for your mail that prevents
MITM, it's hard to see how to make it any simpler. This is the same issue
that DANE has had all along, that the people who understand DNS and who
manage DNS are often not the ones who manage whatever applications are
using certificates. It's only been in the past couple of weeks that
there's even been a beta version of openssl that can check DANE certs.
Regards,
John Levine, johnl(_at_)taugh(_dot_)com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail.
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