On Fri, 21 Feb 2003 Mark(_dot_)Andrews(_at_)isc(_dot_)org wrote:
On Fri, 21 Feb 2003 Mark(_dot_)Andrews(_at_)isc(_dot_)org wrote:
You haven't shown any proof of that. The "proof" you showed, was the
result of a misconfiguration.
No. It is the result of operational reality. Whenever you
have a parent and child zones under different administrative
controls it is impossible to change both zones simultaniously.
It is also impossible using AXFR or any other mechanism
which transfers *individual* zones to transfer them to a
secondary and guarantee that they will arrive simultaniously.
Having parent and child zone under different administrative con
trol
is the norm not the execption.
Actually, a parent always has some control over the child. It exercises
this control through the glue records. When the glue records are in the
child zone, they need to be merged.
Which is it. Does the parent control the contents of its zone
or does the child?
You seem not to understand the subtlety of the issue. The parent (like
real parents) ultimately controls the child, but the child (like real
children) has limited autonomy.
It is a subtle issue. You can only apply changes to the PRIMARY source
of the data. Applying changes at any other point has the potential to
cause servers to serve incorrect content.
If a zone transfer happens while they
are inconsistent, it is possible for some strange results to happen.
Ordinarilly, zone transfers don't happen when they are inconsistent, sinc
e
the inconsistency is usually short.
It doesn't matter if they normally happen while they are
consistant. You have to get correct behaviour while they
are inconsistant. Changing zone content on SECONDARY servers
is not correct behaviour.
Sure it is. Unless you can arrange to conduct both updates simultaneosly.
While it would be possible to coordinate such changes on the phone,
relativity could come into play someday. It has nothing to do with zone
transfers. Its part of the state of the system. Zone transfers is only one
way to learn about the state of the system.
Changing the content of zones in SECONDARY servers prevents other SECONARY
servers using the first SECONDARY server learning the correct state of the
system.
Any zone transfers made during the inconsistent window are corrected so
long as the child zone is updated with correct information after the
parent is updated.
This is a incorrect statement.
Could you elaborate?
Server A master to parent.
Server B master to child.
Server C slave to parent and child.
Server D slave to parent using C as master.
All servers with NS RRset N of child zone.
Server B updates NS RRset to N'.
Server A updates NS RRset to N'.
Server C transfers parent from A.
Server D transfers parent zone from C.
Server C transfers child zone from B.
End state with modification (BIND 8/tinydns).
Server A N', Server B N', Server C N', Server D N.
End state without modificatin (BIND 9).
Server A N', Server B N', Server C N', Server D N'.
You will notice that the last transfer above was the transfer of
the child zone.
Now lets update the child last.
Server A updates NS RRset to N'.
Server B updates NS RRset to N'.
Server C transfers parent from A.
Server D transfers parent zone from C.
Server C transfers child zone from B.
End state with modification (BIND 8/tinydns).
Server A N', Server B N', Server C N', Server D N.
End state without modificatin (BIND 9).
Server A N', Server B N', Server C N', Server D N'.
You will notice that the last transfer above was the transfer of
the child zone.
Lets wait for the parent zone to propogate to all servers
before updating the child zone.
Server A updates NS RRset to N'.
Server C transfers parent from A.
Server D transfers parent zone from C.
Server B updates NS RRset to N'.
Server C transfers child zone from B.
End state with modification (BIND 8/tinydns).
Server A N', Server B N', Server C N', Server D N.
End state without modificatin (BIND 9).
Server A N', Server B N', Server C N', Server D N'.
Now if you force everyone to wait until the child zone
has progated.
Server B updates NS RRset to N'.
Server C transfers child zone from B.
Server A updates NS RRset to N'.
Server C transfers parent from A.
Server D transfers parent zone from C.
End state with modification (BIND 8/tinydns).
Server A N', Server B N', Server C N', Server D N'.
End state without modificatin (BIND 9).
Server A N', Server B N', Server C N', Server D N'.
You will notice that in all examples BIND 9 ends in the correct
state. The same cannot be said for BIND 8 or tinydns.
Modification of SECONDARY zone content is NOT required or desirable
for the correct operation of the DNS.
Frequently the parent and child zone are under different administrative
control, and are frequently on different servers. In such a case, the
contents of the parent zone aren't merged with the child in the child's
server, and no evidence of the inconsistency is seen through zone
transfers. However, the inconsistency still exists and may still be
visible by resolvers and nameservers that lookup the glue records.
Nobody is claiming that inconsistancies don't occur all the
time. What we are claiming is that those inconsistancies
need to be preserved in SECONDARY servers for the correct
operation of the DNS. That they can only be corrected by
modifying the PRIMARY source of the zones.
??? I can't parse this with respect to your previous statements. Could
you rephrase it?
You make changes at the PRIMARY server for the zone.
You do not make changes to zones anywhere else.
During the period in which the zone is inconsistent, there is no guarantee
the zone will work. Depending on the nature of the change, wrong
information may be given in queries as well. Suppose the parent is
removing control from the child, and has updated the glue to remove
referals to the child nameservers. For some time (the TTL, at least), the
original child servers will be queried.
What does this have to do with this draft?
On the other hand, the child zone may not even exist yet on the childs
nameservers. Referals to the zone fail.
What does that have to do with this draft?
To make a concrete example, Osama registers alquaeda.com, and begins
coordinating his evil deeds. The registrar delegates the alquaeda.com as a
child of .com. Eventually, the government intervenes, and .com replaces
Osamas nameserver glue with new glue pointing to government servers. For a
time, this zone will be inconsistent. Note that in this case, the zone
transfers will not indicate the inconsistency. However, for a short time,
Osama will be able to put up a message warning his followers not to go to
the government run site. This can't be avoided, no matter what gyrations
you put AXFR through.
What has this got to do with this draft?
It makes no difference that the inconsistency _could_, _in_some_cases_, be
seen at the secondaries.
It does make a difference as demonstated above.
You have obtained no benefits by these constraints.
There are clear benefits in preserving zone contents on
SECONDARY servers.
Such as?
Your term "preserving zone contents" is misleading. The zone contents are
not corrupted. The glue is inconsistent. What is the benefit of
preventing any trace of inconsistency in the secondary?
It may be inconsistant but which version is correct? The copy
in the child may be out of date.
It has nothing to do with IXFR. It has nothing to do with anything.
IXFR still requires the content to only be changed in response
to IXFR deltas.
It is necessary, since the parent has glue records in the child zone.
The parent therefore has (always) a part of the child zone. If that serve
r
also loads the child zone (or perhaps generates part of it dynamically),
it quite reasonable to merge the records as though the zone includes
multiple files, which in theory, it does.
No it isn't. Changes need to come from the PRIMARY source not
from intermediate sources.
The intermediate sources aren't making changes. They are, at worst,
propogating old information mixed with new information. However, this is
visible in other ways besides zone transfers.
You are changing the contents if you mix data from different zones.
The child zone contents will only be correct when the administrators of
both zones agree on the contents of the glue records, and update their
parts of the child zone accordingly. It will not be correct until then,
regardless of how many zone transfers take place.
Which is what I've been saying all along. It doesn't require
a server to "correct" the content at a intermediate point. Such
"corrections" actually cause problems.
Good. Then you agree that Bind 8 behavior is correct.
BIND 8 "corrects" data at intermediate points. BIND 9 doesn't.
BIND 8's behaviour is wrong.
Nothing in RFC 1033 / 1034 / 1035 says that a server is permitt
ed
to alter the content of a zone. The responability for maintain
ing
consistancy between zones is a administrative function.
This is a loaded statement. The part of the server NOT involved in
responding to queries and zone transfers is part of the administrative
function. So, as part of that administrative function, it has to be able
to modify the RR and zones accordingly. Your proposed changes exclude a
huge part of the potential for intelligence in name servers. And do so
with no benefits.
The benefits are correct operation of the DNS regardless of the
propogation timings involved. If servers don't modify slave zone
content then which the master servers are brought into sync all
the servers will be brought into sync.
We already have correct operation of DNS. The zone contents are
inconsistent until both adminstrators come to agreement. The child zone
should be updated last. After the child zone is brought into agreement
with the parent glue, zone transfers will be made which are correct. Only
then will zone transfers will be correct. Zone transfers made while the
administrators are not in agreement will not be correct, even if there is
no apparent evidence in the zone data from the child (such as a mixture of
new and old glue) they are still incorrect. NS Queries against the parent
and child servers will return different results.
What have you been smoking?
This is not guarenteed if the zone content is modified by a
secondary server.
Strange, that was my reaction, too. I'm just trying to be polite.
77
%
work just fine. We don't want to break 77% of the servers out the
re.
You really think that it will break those servers? LOL.
They will not be compliant, and thus will need to be changed. Thus, t
hey
would be broken by definition of not being compliant.
So. Just because they will not be compliant doesn't mean
that that they need to be replaced immediately. That
non-compliance doesn't hurt most of them. For those where
it does have a negative impact it will mean that they should
be able to request a fix from their vendor.
You seem to make a case that in general, non-compliance doesn't hurt
anything. This is false, for both technical and commercial reasons.
Technically, it hurts interoperability, which has some many obvious harms
I won't go into them. Commercially, implementations make and advertise
compatibility and standards compliance claims. This retroactively makes
those claims false, which harms the business and reputation of those othe
r
vendors.
They will be harmed much more if they don't correct a common
error now that it has been pointed out.
Except, there are no errors, beyond a window of inconsistency that cannot
be avoided, and in fact, that window isn't fixed. Nor do you fix the
"error". They are _still_ inconsistent for a period. And the child will
_still_ have to be updated last.
You obviously don't understand the problem
The claims were made in good faith and will be accepted as
such.
I'm not convinced. If they were, we would have argued this before Bind 9
was released, and before a book was sent out. Probably about 3 years ago.
Someone knew years ago when they wrote the "backward compatibility" mode,
that they had a protocol issue that would have to come before
namedroppers. That they delayed for so long doesn't indicate good faith
to me.
We having been saying for years before BIND 9 was released that
that BIND 8 had this wrong. BIND 9 conforms to RFC 1034.
Axfr-clarify arose because it was pointed out that IXFR depended
upon the definition of AXFR and that AXFR was not well specified.
77% will need a fix from the vendor, if we were to accept these changes.
The vendor that made false claims of compatibility and standards
compliance is Bind 9. It should suffer the commercial damage to its
business and reputation, as a result.
BIND 9 conforms to RFC 1034. Nothing in RFC 1034 says to
merge zone content. If fact 1034 says that this a administrative
responsability.
It does right now, due to a knowingly reckless exploitation of ambiguity
in the AXFR. Once AXFR is clarified, Bind 9 will have to use its 'backward
compatibility' mode to be compliant.
What "reckless" exploitation?
It is "knowingly reckless" because the Bind 9 implementers _KNEW_ they
needed to provide a "backward compatibility". That means they knew what
they were doing was incompatible with any (all actually) reasonable
interpretation (however ambiguous) of 1034.
The only thing that requires a backward compatability switch
is sending multiple records in a message.
BIND 4 accepted these back in 1996. Other vendors started
accepting these back in 1996. BIND 8 has always accepted
them and could be configured to send them. BIND 9 defaults
to sending them and can be configured not to.
At the same time as this was happening other vendors also
started sending them. We all knew that there was interoprability
issues that were a result of oversites in the implementation.
One vendor even made use of the fact that named (and I
presume other servers) didn't barf on a oversized query to
signal to it servers that they could send a multi-record
respones.
Your failure to comprehend the consequences of the changes does not l
esse
n
the effect. We now agree that these changes aren't necessary to supp
ort
IXFR. You were part of the bad engineering that led to the unnecessar
y
creation of these changes in Bind 9. You were also part of the bad
decision making that led to the distribution of these changes to Bind
9
users prior to standardization, and quite possibly you were part of t
he
bad decision making that resulted in publishing a book on the subject
,
prior to acceptance of your modifications to standards. In short, you
hav
e
shown bad judgement.
I never said that they we not necessary for IXFR. I said that
that your descripition of how to generate the differences was
irrelevent to this discussion.
Ok, you are half way there. They are irrelevant because IXFR is
irrelevant. These changes are not necessary to IXFR, as I explained that
IXFR can work with the current AXFR, or even without AXFR.
IXFR cannot work through SECONDARY servers that change zone
content regardless of whether the content was learnt via
AXFR or IXFR.
Sure it can. It doesn't need AXFR at all. And the secondary's aren't
making arbitrary changes at all.
If servers wern't making arbitary changes we would not be having
this discussion.
It was bad engineering to merge the data sets together in the
first place. It was not required by RFC 1033/ 1034 / 1035.
It had negative consequences. It was good engineering to
correct this. It was also good engineering to report a
common error to the community so that other vendors could
fix their mistakes.
Actually, since the parent has the glue in the child zone, it has part of
the child zone as well as the master zone. Merging them together is not
prohibited, and in the case where child and parent have the same
adminstrator, as might be the case where most of the child is simply
automatically generated by the nameserver, can make things much easier.
Your constraints preclude this unnecessarilly.
The constraint in on the SECONDARY server.
So? It is still unnecesary.
Next you will tell me that the grass is blue and the sky is green.
If you can't see the need for the constraint stop blocking those
that do.
Since I can think of cases where it is useful to merge records together,
it is bad engineering to remove that flexibility and obtain no benefits i
n
return.
Trying to "belittle" the effects with the "LOL", as opposed to offeri
ng
anything substantive, simply suggests that you have no appreciation o
f th
e
seriousness of the changes. Perhaps you should take this more seriou
sly.
I'm quite aware of what the change requires. I'm also aware
that most of the nameserver are used in situations where
the zone contents is already preserved because they are not
serving zones with parent / child relationships.
Apparently, you aren't even aware that your changes will make all non-bin
d
9 servers non-compliant. Had you been aware of that, it seems you would
have brought this proposal forward something like 3 years ago, before
releasing Bind 9, and before publishing a book on the subject.
Well you obviously have not been reading. ISC is not the
only vendor to come to the same conclusion about preserving
zone content. I suspect that they are just bored with
arguing with you and Dan.
I think they just haven't really read the proposal's, and have taken some
misleading assurances at face value.
Anyone saying that all the nameservers need to be replaced
immediately is spreading FUD. LOL the the correct reponse
to FUD.
Making 77% of the servers non-compliant is a fact of your proposed
changes. It is another fact, as explained, that non-compliant servers
will need to be replaced. Will they suddenly stop working? It depends on
whether other implementations want to implement a "backwards
compatibility" mode. If they don't implement this mode, then the answer i
s
yes, they will stop working as soon as these updates are deployed by othe
r
vendors. Of course, this is a bad result.
Well they havn't stopped working in the last two years that
this code has been out there. Nothing in this drafts stops
a server implementing it taking to any other server.
Uhh, wrong. The drafts make the current AXFR non-compliant. There is
nothing that would require a server to implement the old AXFR and provide
a "backwards compatibility" mode such as Bind 9 has.
So you want
"Slaves MUST accept messages containing any number of answer RRs. For
compatibility with old slaves, masters that support sending multiple
answers per message SHOULD be configurable to revert to the
historical mode of one answer per message, and the configuration
SHOULD be settable on a per-slave basis."
replaced with
"Slaves MUST accept messages containing any number of answer RRs. For
compatibility with old slaves, masters that support sending multiple
answers per message MUST be configurable to revert to the
historical mode of one answer per message, and the configuration
SHOULD be settable on a per-slave basis."
So servers running today, won't be able to talk to strictly compliant
servers that don't have a backwards compatibility mode.
There is one backwards compatiblity switch which is only
requires if you decide to send multiple records in a single
messages. A server is not required to send multiple records
in a single message.
But is allowed to, and a server that can't receive such messages won't be
able to get the zone.
1) It doesn't say that it adds a completely new, incompatible zone
transfer protocol. New protocols should be made through a different
process, which includes experimentation. I'm not against experimentin
g
with a new protocol. Indeed, I think this idea has some merit. Howeve
r, i
t
can't be "end-run standardized" by a "clarification". There is a proc
ess.
It isn't new. All it is saying is that the contents tramitted
out MUST be that transmitted in. This occurs most of the time
already. Note BIND is not the only implementation that does
this. We have already had reports of 3 other implementations
doing this. Even the implementations that don't guarentee the
contents do this most of the time. It has no negative effects.
No, Section 3.1 is a whole new derivative of AXFR. That is new.
Actually it's always been allowed by RFC 1034. Just because
it wasn't implement initially doesn't mean that it was not
allowed.
Uhh, wrong, except in an unreasonably broad technical exception due to the
vagueness of 1034.
Multiple records in the answer section have always been part
of the standard.
4) It doesn't say that it changes the definition of zone data to be
public. Zone data is absolutely not "public by definition". It could
very
well be useful to tag certain RRs as non-public, and exclude them fro
m
zone transfers to public servers. This "clarification" precludes that
.
This is really 2 changes.
Nowhere in RFC 1033 / 1034 / 1035 does it say that zone transfe
rs
are restricted to secondaries. Nowhere in RFC 1033 / 1034 / 10
35
does it say that you should restrict zone tranfers.
I don't think you understood my statement. I'm talking about the
definition of zone data. Nowhere does 1034 etc say that zone data is
public. It may well have been thought to be public, originally, but sinc
e
I can easily see a useful purpose in withholding some private RRs, there
isn't any reason to preclude that behavior.
Does this address your concerns?
No. Because it might be reasonable not to give complete zone data.
"The zone transfer protocol allows read-only access to the complete
zone data. When the data being served to the public it is
generally acceptable to allow unrestricted access to it via AXFR.
Sites that wish to avoid disclosing their full zone data MAY
restrict zone transfer access to authorized slaves."
If you have part of a zone to which you would normally
return REFUSED to I suggest that you also return REFUSED
to AXFR.
If you want to be able to return partial zones then I suggest
that a new TYPE be defined so that receipients can know
that the results will be incomplete.
So far as the secondary is concerned, the zone is complete. If you do
this, you don't want to tell people that you have some data that isn't
public. Nor would you ever need to.
Well if you don't want to tell them that you have private
part then you won't be answering with REFUSED. You effectively
have two zones that just have a lot in common. Treat them
as such.
Mark
--
Mark Andrews, Internet Software Consortium
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET:
Mark(_dot_)Andrews(_at_)isc(_dot_)org