(1) QC assumes that most of the photons from the transmitter of a
"quantum" message, reach the receiver. This assumption is therefore used to
errorneously deduce that the communicating parties will therefore be
able to detect interception or interference.
Problem(a): This is not true for blue laser transceiver technology,
as the receiver of a "quantum" message in this case needs far less than
0.0001% of photons routed through blue laser routing satelittes, to receive a
message.
Problem(b): Optical fibre losses an appreciable amount of photons which
can be "tapped" non-intrusively.
(2) Traditional intelligence gathering can be used to intercept or
reveal quantum cryptography keys and settings - e.g. the tapping of computer
monitor radiation, or intrusion into a network via weaknesses in
wireless security or simply by way of deployment of corrupt practices.
(3) Quantum cryptographic communications is based on monoplex and not
the duplex model of channel usage - I stand to be corrected.
(4) Intrusive penetration into a quantum cryptography secured network
causes inteference which results into the jamming or shutdown of the system,
while intrusive penetration into a "standard code" network will not result in
the stoppage of communications.
Note : Those who intercept or retrieve standard code security
information, I many cases never get to interprete it. The intentions of a
hacker
may simply be to interfere - DoS ( Denial of Service ).
(5) Commercially available Quantum Cryptography technology is only
optical fibre based, and cannot secure satelitte based blue laser quantum
communications technology.
Nyagudi Musandu
Consultant / Researcher
Tel.: 254-722-484730
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