--On Wednesday, 15 October, 2003 13:45 -0400 Keith Moore
<moore(_at_)cs(_dot_)utk(_dot_)edu> wrote:
Now, whether that interception and diversion of DNS queries
is a moral activity is a different question. But, if you
believe strongly enough that having a NAT in the first place
puts one into a serious state of sin, then the marginal sin
of intercepting DNS queries for private addresses, to
prevent the sort of problems those queries cause, seems to
me to be fairly small.
I probably agree. But I guess my question is "where does it
end?"
That is, how many things do we change elsewhere in the network
in order to minimize the operational problems that crop up
with NATs? What is the cost of those changes, and how much do
they impair the ability of the network to support applications?
That, it seems to me, is a pragmatic way to state the key
architectural question. A different version of it, borrowed
from a different debate, is how much a particular new capability
is permitted to force deployed systems or applications code to
change the way they are doing things in the interest of the
innovation contained in that new capability.
john