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Re: national security

2003-11-28 04:15:26
On 27-nov-03, at 23:20, jfcm wrote:

Some others have technical implications. I would like to quote some suggestions listed in the preparatory document, to get advices I could quote at the meeting or in its report. Also to list the alternative and additional suggestions some might do.

Ok, I'm not going to quote all the details...

This looks like a big old bag of DNS tricks. Obviously the virtue of each can be discussed individually, but wouldn't it make more sense to start thinking about a more structured approach to arrive at the intended benefits?

For instance, one issue seems to be the ability to continue to reach systems using domain names when there is a problem with the DNS infrastructure. This could be addressed by modifying the caching mechanisms in DNS resolvers. The way things are done now is throw away the old shoes (cached information) and then see if new ones can be found. Rather bizarre if you think about it.

2. a menu server system permitting to access sites though their IP address only. This would be a good promotion for IPv6 due to the easiness to support IP virtual hosts addresses. As a security oriented alternative to the NSI network unstabilization.

This could lead to pressure to make IP addresses more portable, which isn't a good thing.

6. an evolution towards an international root matrix supporting proximity root servers and proximity TLDs for abbreviated addressing through local TLDs. The organization and the procedure of the common authoritative root matrix should be internationally approved and subject to the ICP-3 proposed testing rules. A quoted example documents the target as "hart.sos" of pacemakers always resolving to the nearest hospital (as decided by local authorities).

This isn't something you can do with simple (or even not so simple) n-faced DNS. For instance, here in the Netherlands many service providers backhaul all their traffic to Amsterdam over the phone infrastructure (dial-up) or ATM (DSL). Those customers then share IP address space and DNS resolvers. Getting the location info back in there would be almost impossible.

However, it could be useful to create mechanisms that make it easier for hosts to discover location information. For instance, through a DHCP option. This information can then be used when searching directories or search engines. (This would have interesting commercial possibilities as well.)

- a national host numbering scheme. With an immediate identification of any host on any network whatever the location change or connection organized. This second would also protect IPv6 technology and equipment from a K2 like syndrome when a new plan could be discussed, as it would have permitted to validate the multiple plan possibility.

In the multi6 (multihoming in IPv6) working group, as one of many proposals, we've been looking at putting a 64 bit host identifier in the bottom 64 bits of an IPv6 address. If such a host identifier is crypto-based (ie, a hash of a public key) then it is possible to authenticate a host at any time regardless of where the host connects to the network at that particular time and without the need for a PKI or prior communication.

(I have no idea what "K2 syndrome" means by the way, and it looks like Google doesn't either.)




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