Harald Tveit Alvestrand wrote:
Christian,
...
3/ Do we have an analysis of the policy implications in bringing
responsibility for the administration of Internet Standards negotiation
into the same body that is responsible for their oversight (via
appointment of IAB and Trustee appeal role)?
That's what the discussion in section 4.2.3 (Scenario B) is intended to
cover. See also the comment in section 4.5 (Scenario D).
So there has been thought applied to this topic. I don't know whether
you consider that an "analysis" or not - this is one topic where I would
like to get feedback from the community.
Harald
I think Christian is actually raising a point that *isn't* covered explicitly
in 4.2.3 and that applies equally to scenarios A and B. By making IETF
administration a specific function of ISOC, would we introduce any
*new* potential conflict of interest for ISOC trustees in their roles
as the confirming body for the IAB slate (RFC 3777) and as the final step
in the appeals process (section 6.5.3 of RFC 2026)?
I don't see why. ISOC trustees have a fiduciary duty to ISOC, but given
how narrowly their two IETF roles are drawn, I can't see where there is any
significant new potential for conflict because of the administration
being on the ISOC budget.
Christian also implies the converse question: would scenarios C & D
reduce a hypothetical existing conflict of interest for the ISOC
trusteees? Again, I don't see why. Firstly, I don't think there is
an existing conflict of interest. Secondly, changing the IETF from
an unincorporated association to an incorporated entity really
cannot affect the ISOC trustees' fiduciary duty to ISOC, so any
hypothetical conflict would not be changed.
So I think this issue is neutral with respect to the choice
between (A or B) versus (C or D).
The usual "I am not a lawyer" disclaimers apply.
Brian
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