Harald,
Another dissenting view...
Unless we modify the suggested text to deal with all sorts of
cases that we probably can't predict and that would make things
quite complicated, I don't see this working as intended. The
sorts of cases I'm concerned about include not only information
given the IAOC under non-disclosure provisions but also
personnel matters, matters that could become the subject of
litigation or that were already being litigated, and so on, for
probably a longer list than I can imagine.
It probably will come as no surprise that I'm uncomfortable with
the potential intersection of "whipped-up mob" with
"administrative entity and processes".
So let me suggest an entirely different model for your
consideration:
(1) The IAB and/or IESG can formally ask (I don't care about
the details) the IAOC, or the IAD, to reconsider its decision
on any matter. If such a request is made, the relevant body or
individual is obligated to review the decision, seek more voters
or a larger consensus if possible, and then either reaffirm the
decision or make another one.
(2) Any member of the community (or, preferably, any handful of
members of the community) can ask the IAB and/or IESG to
initiate such a reconsideration request. The decision on that
request t initiate reconsideration can be appealed using normal
mechanisms.
(3) If the IAOC regularly misbehaves, the correct remedy is to
fire them, just like any other body acting as a board of
directors. So we need to look carefully at recall and related
procedures and make sure that they can be used... easily enough,
but no more easily than that.
Following the model of the current text leads to opportunities
for micromanagement by appeal, and, if the IAOC and IAD are to
be effective, we just don't want to go there. Put differently,
if people don't believe that The Right Thing is being done, they
shouldn't be looking in detail at particular decisions. They
should, instead, be suggesting that the IAOC review its own
decisions contributing whatever additional information is
available to that review. And, if the IAOC adopts a pattern of
doing Wrong Things, it should be time to replace them (starting
with a request for resignations), not to try to retune or
override individual decisions.
Get the right people into these positions, and then let them do
the job.
If we can't find the right people and put them there, then none
of these procedures --other than firing the duds and trying
again-- are good enough to protect the IETF. Perhaps worse, we
then run the risk of getting us seriously bogged down while we
try to use those incremental correction procedures.
john
--On Wednesday, 22 December, 2004 16:21 +0100 Harald Tveit
Alvestrand <harald(_at_)alvestrand(_dot_)no> wrote:
These two tickets are linked, as both contain discussions on
how the IAD and the IAOC behave where people believe that they
have not done the Right Thing (for whatever meaning of
"right").
The text from the head of the #720 thread:
While there is a method to appeal procedural lapses by the
IAOC, and I am fine with that, there does not seem to be a
way for a member of the community to question, i.e. appeal,
the actions of the IAD. I.e. 3.4 does not contain method to
appeal the actions of the IAD for procedural issues or
suspected malfeasance.
The thread in #725 is rather convoluted, and touches upon a
number of issues - DoS attacks, ability to appeal decisions
rather than procedure violations, recourse to recall and
whether that is appropriate.... go read the thread for details.
The current relevant text from 3.4 is:
If someone believes that the IAOC has violated the IAOC
rules and
procedures, he or she can ask the IETF leadership to
investigate the
matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of
procedural
issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG.
If the IESG, IAB or the ISOC Board of Trustees find that
procedures
have been violated, they may advise the IAOC, but do not
have
authority to overturn or change a decision of the IAOC.
and from 3.2:
The IAOC's role is to provide appropriate direction to the
IAD, to
review the IAD's regular reports, and to oversee the IASA
functions
to ensure that the administrative needs of the IETF
community are
being properly met.
Suggested resolution:
1) Make a separate section for the appeals stuff in 3.4 (for
clarity), so that this becomes section 3.5
2) Change the section to read:
If someone believes that the IAOC has made a decision that
is clearly
not in the IETF's best interest, he or she can ask the IETF
leadership
to investigate the
matter, using the same procedure as is used for appeals of
procedural
issues in the IETF, starting with the IESG.
In cases where appeals concern
legally-binding actions of the IAOC (hiring, signed
contracts, etc.),
the bodies handling the appeal may advise the IAOC, but are
not
authorized to make or unmake any legally binding agreements
on the
part of IASA.
In cases where no legally-binding actions are at stake, the
bodies
handling the appeal may nullify the IAOC decision and ask
IAOC to restart
its decision process.
(mostly suggestion from Margaret)
3) Add the following to the IAOC's role in 3.2:
The IAOC will hear and respond to concerns from the
community about
the activities of the IASA.
Does this make sense, or are we leaning too far in the "too
many appeals" direction?
Harald
_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
Ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf
_______________________________________________
Ietf mailing list
Ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf