Harald,
I still think this is a bad model, but I'm clearly (at least
among those who are speaking up) in the minority on that. With
one correction, and a last quibble, I think it is now at least
consistent enough that, if it causes problems, we can get to the
substance of them and fix it rather than getting tangled up with
procedural quibbling. So I think we should go ahead.
The correction: The last sentence should probably read "...may
the IAB or ISOC BoT overturn...", since the IESG is not in the
appeals chain.
_The quibble_ (long, unfortunately, but I think worth
understanding before we push forward). I expect this comment to
be ignored in the rush to get the document out, and it can be
fixed later if needed (and I imagine would be fixed after the
first incident were one to occur), but want to get a concern on
the record.
One of the things with which a number of members of the
community has been very concerned has been to prevent the ISOC
BoT from meddling in the operations of the IASA. While I think
other checks on them will prove adequate, I recognize a
community concern when I see one. I don't see "review whether
procedures were followed and, if not, send things back and tell
them to review and reconsider their actions" to be significantly
problematic on the "meddling" front, and that is all the
authority the ISOC BoT has up to the beginning of that
problematic last paragraph. But the last paragraph gives "the
reviewing body" the authority to overturn IAOC decisions and
requires consultation with the IAOC before doing so and the ISOC
BoT is a reviewing body.
Seriously paranoid scenario under the above model: The ISOC BoT
takes a large overdose of drugs that induce a desire to go
meddle in the IASA. On some pretense, one of their members or a
designated stooge (all of whom are members of the community
under our deliberately-vague rules) appeals an IAOC decision to
the IAOC Chair, the IAB, and then to the ISOC BoT. The ISOC
turns that "consultation" into a negotiation about decisions to
possibly be overturned, procedural changes to be made in ways of
doing things, etc., and we end up with a fairly full-scale
license to meddle.
I don't think this is likely to happen, but I don't like
procedures that are subject to abuse when that opportunity can
be easily avoided. Possible solution: permit _only_ the IAB to
overturn a decision (exceptional circumstance, etc., text
remains). If the ISOC BoT decides to reverse the IAB on an
appeal, all they can do is what they are essentially restricted
to doing under the standards process appeal chain: send the
question back with instructions to reconsider. I think we can
safely leave the question as to whether they send something back
to the IAB or back directly to the IAOC up in the air. But
giving them the authority, even under "exceptional
circumstances", to reverse an IAOC decision, seems to me to
violate the principles of separation that many people have felt
strongly about. Of course, one could also fix this problem by
losing the paragraph, but we have apparently decided against
that.
Finally, these little glitches (both the inclusion of "IESG" and
the more complex question of principle, again point out the
risks of trying to evolve a document this quickly.
john
--On Monday, 31 January, 2005 11:33 +0100 Harald Tveit
Alvestrand <harald(_at_)alvestrand(_dot_)no> wrote:
Most responses on the list have spoken in favour of leaving
the last section (overturn decisions) in; John pointed out
that it's completely unclear what the real rules for this type
of action is. And I still don't like it.
Still - I think this is a text that is possible to live with.
3.5 Review and Appeal of IAD and IAOC Decision
The IAOC is directly accountable to the IETF community for
the
performance of the IASA. In order to achieve this, the
IAOC and IAD
will ensure that guidelines are developed for regular
operational
decision making. Where appropriate, these guidelines
should be
developed with public input. In all cases, they must be
made public.
...
In exceptional cases, when no other recourse seems
reasonable, the
reviewing body may overturn or reverse a non-binding
decision or
action of the IAOC. This should be done after careful
consideration
and consultation with the IAOC regarding the
ramifications of this
action. In no circumstances may the IESG or IAB overturn
a decision of
the IAOC that involves a binding contract or overturn a
personnel-
related action (such as hiring, firing, promotion,
demotion,
performance reviews, salary adjustments,
etc.).
Comments?
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