Below is a summary of the discussion that occurred at the SAAG
session during IETF 64. When MD5 or SHA-1 is used to support digital
signatures or used by itself, recent cryptographic research findings
indicate the need for a transition. Therefore, I encourage all IETF
WGs to follow the lead of the Security Area in transition away from
MD5 and SHA-1 toward SHA-256.
TCP-MD5 is one example where a transition is needed. In this case, a
transition to HMAC-SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-256 seems like a reasonable move.
Russ Housley
Security Area Director
= = = = = = = = = =
During IETF 64, the Security Area Advisors Group (SAAG) session was
dedicated to the discussion of hash function "breaks" and the
appropriate IETF response to this situation.
Eric Rescorla from gave a presentation on deploying a new hash
function. The presentation is based on a paper that Eric co-authored
with Steve Bellovin. All of the IETF security protocols that were
analyzed required work in order to support transition to new hash
functions. The paper is available at
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/new-hash.pdf
Russ Housley gave a presentation on the Security Area response to
these hash function "breaks." We should "walk, not run." This is
not a problem yet, but as the attacks are improved it will become a
problem. Russ shared his conclusions from the NIST Hash Workshop
held on October 31st and November 1st.
* SHA-1 should be reach its "end of life" digital
signatures by 2010;
* The IETF cannot expect any new standard hash functions
before 2010;
* The security ADs have decided that we need to transition
to SHA-256 now; and
* There will probably be another transition once a new hash
function is available.
The IETF needs to become good at transitions as we have at least
two. Within the Security Area, protocols with active WGs will be
analyzed within those WGs; others will be handled in SAAG. The
following directive to WG Chairs in the Security Area was given:
* Perform Bellovin-Rescorla analysis on every protocol in
the WG by IETF 65; and
* Start standards work on transition to SHA-256, but plan
for future transitions.
In some cases it may be appropriate to transition away from hash
functions, perhaps to a message authentication code.
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