It is very clear that at least part of this discussion is due to your
unfamiliarity with English.
Looking at past failures is a very good way to predict the possibility
of similar failures in the future. History is a very good guide to
setting a lower bound on risk.
History is a very poor guide to setting a lower bound on risk, not
least because people have a habit of only looking at the past events
that give them good news.
Most of us know that the typical business cycle lasts 7-10 years.
However the geniuses behind 'Long Term Capital Management' only
reviewed six years of the business cycle ending entirely. When one of
the principals behind LTM is interviewed on TVfor his opinions on the
bailout he is invariably tagged as 'Nobel Laureate', and never 'The
fool who caused the last major fiscal crisis'.
I have fifteen years experience in this business area. I am the only
participant in this debate so far who can claim any direct knowledge
of the business of embedding roots. It is on that basis and on the
basis of direct conversations with my peers in the industry that I
believe that the current DNSSEC specs do not meet the needs of
deployment.
Given that DNSSEC has not achieved deployment in fifteen years and
given that the only deployment momentum that can be seen at the moment
is in the form of 'top-down' edicts from ICANN, Vint Cerf and co, I
think that the onus of proof falls on those who assure us that DNSSEC
does in fact meet deployment requirements.
On Sat, Jun 13, 2009 at 5:25 AM, Masataka
Ohta<mohta(_at_)necom830(_dot_)hpcl(_dot_)titech(_dot_)ac(_dot_)jp> wrote:
Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
Past history is a very bad guarantee that problems will not arise in the
future.
So, you mean your statement:
: Trust roots have to be valid for at least a decade to be acceptable to
: the application vendor community.
hardly guarantee anything.
Be liberal in anticipating repeat of past problems,
Indeed.
Unnoticeable cache poisoning by glues is repeated even with
bailiwick and once again with DNSSEC.
be conservative in
your expectation that new problems will not arise.
The protection is to make protocols as simple as possible.
The following paper discusses about it to some extent.
http://ftp.csci.csusb.edu/ykarant/courses/f2007/csci530/papers/counterpane-ipsec.pdf
Masataka Ohta
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