On Sep 22, 2010, at 9:44 AM, Paul Hoffman wrote:
At 10:21 AM -0600 9/22/10, Peter Saint-Andre wrote:
On 9/14/10 12:51 AM, Stefan Santesson wrote:
General:
I would consider stating that server certificates according to this profile
either MUST or SHOULD have the serverAuth EKU set since it is allways
related to the use of TSL and server authentication. At least it MUST be set
when allowing checks of the CN-ID (see 2.3 below).
[..snip..]
What possible advantage is there to making certificates that do not have this
flag set be excluded from the practices you are defining? That is, if a TLS
client gets a certificate from a TLS server that the TLS server says is its
authentication certificate, why should the client care whether or not that
flag is set? That flag is an assertion from the CA, not from the server who
is authenticating.
Does this point need discussion? Without checking, I suspect that 5280 says
you obey the EKU, period. OTOH I think Paul raises a valid point.
OTOH (again) one could argue that the EKU provides a way to prevent a stolen
cert/key issued to the machine for a different function from being repurposed
to support a fake server. (I'm not convinced this is significant, but it's
something.)
Absent discussion and consensus, I vote for whatever 5280 says, which I suppose
is what the current silence on the topic equates to.
------------------------------------------------------
The opinions expressed in this message are mine,
not those of Caltech, JPL, NASA, or the US Government.
Henry(_dot_)B(_dot_)Hotz(_at_)jpl(_dot_)nasa(_dot_)gov, or
hbhotz(_at_)oxy(_dot_)edu
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