Re: Call for a Jasmine Revolution in the IETF: Privacy, Integrity, Obscu

I also recall a Plenary presentation during IETF 57 in Vienna which
suggested a reversal in the IETF's previous stance on this topic.
http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/57/slides/plenary-10.pdf

If my memory serves me correctly, I believe the logic was along the lines
of "Law enforcement agencies require some capabilities that are aking to
backdoors.  Given this, it would be better if we (who know what we are
doing) designed these capabilities, rather than leave it to others do so."

Regards,

Ed  J.

On Wed, Mar 9, 2011 at 10:50 AM, Harald Alvestrand 
<harald(_at_)alvestrand(_dot_)no>wrote:

> Actually, this discussion has been going on for longer than so-far
> referenced docs show.
>
> One of my favourite RFCs on the subject:
>
> RFC 2804 "IETF Policy on Wiretapping." IAB, IESG. May 2000.
>
>   The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has been asked to take a
>   position on the inclusion into IETF standards-track documents of
>   functionality designed to facilitate wiretapping.
>
>   This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its
>   answer is "no", and what that answer means.
>
>
>
>
> On 03/06/11 21:52, Dean Willis wrote:
>
> >  Marc suggested:
> >
> >    I any case, may I suggest a Bar BOF in Prague?  Plotting
> >    revolutions in
> >    coffeehouses is a very old tradition.
> >
> > Excellent idea. Perhaps this should be plotted over jasmine tea instead of
> > coffee...
> >
> >
> > The point I really want to stress is that we must stop deliberately
> > designing privacy, integrity, and obscurity weakness into our protocols,
> >  and where we can't avoid weakness we should at least consider its
> > implications. We have a real lack of understanding of these issues in the
> > community. For example, if Alice and Bob have a communications session, IETF
> > has never clued onto the fact that Alice and Bob might want intermediary
> > Charlie not jut to be unable to read the data of their session, but to not
> > even be able to know that they have one. We might not be able to hide the
> > fact that Alice has a session with SOMEBODY from her next-door neighbor
> > Allen, or the fact that Bob has a session from his next-door neighbor Burt,
> > but even if Allen and Burt are working together, we should be able to hide
> > the Alice-Bob relationship.
> >
> > What do I mean by not designing weakness into our protocols? I give you
> > SIP, for example.  After twelve years of work, I have yet to make a real
> > call using the optional "sips" signaling model. Why? It's optional. Nobody
> > uses it. Actually, I'm having a hard time using even basic SIP any more --
> > it looks like Google just pulled-the-plug on my telephony ISP service, which
> > had been provided by the Gizmo Project. But that's another problem.
> >
> > --
> > Dean
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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