Hi Jiazi (draft editor)
Please note that I had effort to make below change in this draft, but
my name is not in acknowledgement as others were. Please add my name.
I don't think the changes was not influenced by my inputs and
discussions. I don't think that the changes was to happen if I ignored
the draft ( i.e. it was in WGLC and not much discussions). I don't
think I should be discouraged,
Best regards
Abdussalam Baryun,
+++++++++++++++++
If the IETF culture is to encourage participants then editors SHOULD
add efforts owners in acknowledgements, otherwise participants MAY be
discouraged (depends on individual culture).
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The below message in MANET WG list
On 3/20/13, Jiazi Yi <ietf(_at_)jiaziyi(_dot_)com> wrote:
Dear all,
The authors of nhdp-sec-threats have submitted a new revision based on the
comments during WGLC.
The only technical change is that, a new sub-section is added on link
quality update:
==========
4.8. Attack on Link Quality Update
According to NHDP, "Link quality is a mechanism whereby a router MAY
take considerations other than message exchange into account for
determining when a link is and is not a candidate for being
considered as HEARD or SYMMETRIC. As such, it is a link admission
mechanism.".
Section 14.4 of NHDP [RFC6130] then lists several examples of which
information can be used to update link quality. One of the listed
examples is to update link quality based on [RFC5444] packet
exchanges between neighbor routers, e.g., an NHDP Router may update
the link quality of a neighbor based on receipt or loss of packets if
they include a sequential packet sequence number.
NHDP does not specify how to acquire link quality updates
normatively, however, attack vectors may be introduced if an
implementation chooses to calculate link quality based on packet
sequence numbers. The consequences of such threats would depend on
specific implementations. For example, if the link quality update is
based on sequential packet sequence number from neighbor routers, a
Comprised NDHP Router can spoof packets appearing to be from another
Legitimate NHDP Router that skips some packet sequence numbers. The
NHDP Router receiving the spoofed packets may degrade the link
quality as it appears that several packets have been dropped.
Eventually, the router remove the neighbor when the link quality
drops below HYST_REJECT.
==========
Your comments are welcome.
@chairs:
I suppose that if this section gets approved, there is no need for another
WGLC for the whole document?
best
Jiazi
Begin forwarded message:
From: internet-drafts(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org
Subject: New Version Notification for
draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-02.txt
Date: March 20, 2013 11:43:53 AM GMT+01:00
To: jiazi(_at_)jiaziyi(_dot_)com
Cc: t(_dot_)clausen(_at_)computer(_dot_)org, ulrich(_at_)herberg(_dot_)name
A new version of I-D, draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-02.txt
has been successfully submitted by Jiazi Yi and posted to the
IETF repository.
Filename: draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats
Revision: 02
Title: Security Threats for NHDP
Creation date: 2013-03-20
Group: manet
Number of pages: 17
URL:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-02.txt
Status:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats
Htmlized:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-02
Diff:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-manet-nhdp-sec-threats-02
Abstract:
This document analyses common security threats of the Neighborhood
Discovery Protocol (NHDP), and describes their potential impacts on
MANET routing protocols using NHDP.
The IETF Secretariat
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