At 06:44 20-05-2013, The IESG wrote:
The IESG has received a request from an individual submitter to consider
the following document:
- 'Resource Records for EUI-48 and EUI-64 Addresses in the DNS'
<draft-jabley-dnsext-eui48-eui64-rrtypes-03.txt> as Proposed Standard
The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org mailing lists by 2013-06-17. Exceptionally, comments
may be
This draft is about putting MAC addresses in the DNS. The purpose is
for IP address tracking by vendors. As the RRTYPE has already been
allocated it is useful to document the format. In my humble opinion
it is not a good idea to put MAC address in the DNS. There is some
text in Section 9 about why it may not be a good idea. In Section 9:
"These potential concerns can be mitigated through restricting access
to zones containing EUI48 or EUI64 RRs or storing such information
under a domain name whose construction requires that the querier
already know some other permanent identifier."
The "querier already know some other permanent identifier" reminds me
of security through obscurity. I'll do some selective quoting from
another document:
"Once the MAC-derived suffix mechanism was standardized, it
was perceived to be required and therefore became part of compliance
suites, which continue to compel implementations to support it many
years after the associated vulnerabilities have been identified."
"A comprehensive privacy threat model was never developed (which seems
to be a recurring theme with older protocol development efforts)"
The write-up mentions: "The intended status is standards track with
the label of propsed standard". Why is the intended status "Proposed
Standard"?
As a comment to Joe, the first line in Appendix A.2 was entertaining. :-)
Regards,
-sm