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Re: https at ietf.org

2013-11-25 20:45:51
Randy,

On Nov 25, 2013, at 6:06 PM, Randy Bush <randy(_at_)psg(_dot_)com> wrote:
seems to me that if the amazingly elaborate ceremonies around the root
key do not include m of n needed to open the bottle, with the m and n
distributed among multiple national juristictions, it is merely security
theater.

And is it security theater if the "multiple national jurisdictions" only 
include the 5 Eyes? 

ICANN and Verisign, in a very public manner, tried (given constraints they were 
placed under) to ensure that opening the bottle was exceedingly public and 
documented so it didn't matter who actually did it.  Back during the Root 
Signing Road Show, input was requested many, many times in many, many venues 
(IETF included).

My point is that trotting NSLs out like a bogeyman is not helpful. Identify 
possible _realistic_ attacks and the vulnerabilities that those attacks can 
leverage. The Root KSK DPS is a public document, written under a set of 
assumption and constraints that may no longer hold and undoubtedly far from 
perfect. I am not arguing that the question Ted asks isn't valid, I'm saying 
"send text".

Regards,
-drc

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