Hi Sam,
I expect that a BCP document to have solutions of new/old practices.
The document has opinions but no clear reasonable solutions or
guidances for future/past/present protocols. The attacks defined are
mostly on community for long, but when got serious among some this
time then it became an issue,
Comments below
On Friday, December 13, 2013, Sam Hartman wrote:
Hi.
I strongly support the consensus statements that were the sense of the
room at the IETF 88 technical plenary.
I strongly support publication of a document like this, but I believe
this document should provide more guidance before publication.
I agree
We have a history of publishing vaguely worded security BCPs that are
really hard on our area directors and chairs. As an AD, I found
aspects of RFC 3352, BCP 61 and RFC 4107 very challenging.
The big questions tended to surround protocols already in progress and
architectural re-use.
Let's not do that again.
I agree, and suggest more clear guides.
Protocols already in progress is a fairly obvious problem. I don't
think we want Stephen and Sean to hold a DISCUSS on every document on
the telechat following approval of this BCP because none of them explain
how they mitigate pervasive monitoring.
How can ADs write this BCP without their WGs support (or going through
WG) is it not related to the security area or it is pure general area
or it is related to IESG and IAB. There was a preference in another
thread that a WG chair does not author an adopted work related to that
WG, IMHO, prefer current ADs not to author BCPs related to their Area
only if WGs support it.
Stephen and Sean wouldn't do
something that ridiculous, but I believe they and the community could
use better guidance than "use good judgment." I know as a document
author, chair and former AD I sure could.
I agree that all participants need more time to do better work, why
some want to rush this through LC, will need at least 6 months or
three meetings
my recommendation is that protocols with no significant solution work
accepted by a WG need to address this BCP the same way new protocols
would. Protocols with significant solution work within a WG need to
address this BCP to the extent that doing so is consistent with the
existing work antd doesn't involve reopening decisions that would
otherwise be closed or revisiting earlier stages in the process that
would not otherwise be revisited. So, if you haven't decided on your
security mechanism yet, take this into account. If you're working on
security considerations but your protocol is basically done, write up
how well you did but don't revisit things.
Yes
If you're in last call, move
on as usual.
Disagree
The architectural re-use question is harder to explain. Imagine you're
desiging something new. You could use enum-like things or some other
directory. It would be convenient to use DNS because similar
technologies you care about use DNS. If you use DNS, then people can
more easily monitor the queries to your service. How much do you need
to consider pervasive monitoring in your technology choice.
I see that the document ignores applicability statement section, and
use cases. I agree with your suggestion of explaining.
We've had
this sort of thing come up lots with previous security BCPs; I most
especially remember being told by PCE that they had chosen not to follow
RFC 4107 because they wanted to be like other routing protocols and use
TCP-AO even though it doesn't provide key management.
The issue of architecture re-use is important to discuss in the
community because it significantly affects how much impact this BCP will
have.
I don't think the community realise the impact, because the document
ignores that also, this document can be used by IESG and ADs.
If we say "use good judgment," and nothing more, then we're
basically leaving it entirely up to the WGs,
Not only WG, but I think we will leave it also to ADs of those WG areas.
because cross-area-review
time is really late for telling someone they need a new fundamental
technology. Obviously the WG will have significant impact on this, but
I think if we provide useful guidance here it can really help.
I support more guide in the doc, and more cross area guide in this doc
which not only security area can produce.
My
personal preference is that this BCP should impact future architectural
choices more than RFC 4107 has managed to but that architectural re-use
is quite important.
Yes, please provide your input guides, as you mention above that you
can do better.
A related issue is how to treat extensions to existing protocols.
Again we've had a lot of heart-ache from not specifying that.
This needs another new document of extensions of existing protocols
and the new doc needs to reference this doc.
I think it is important for the community to receive guidance on these
issues. I think it would be fine for this BCP to delegate that
guidance.
Disagree,
I'd support a paragraph describing each issue plus a
paragraph saying that the IESG would provide guidance if the IESG would
be willing to do that.
I will add another important condition, which is the community or WG
requests such guide related to an issue from IESG or others ( similar
to DT job when they get request from community).
Obviously that would mean we're trusting the
IESG to make that decision; I'd be happy to do that. I'd also be happy
to work on guidance to be included in the BCP on these issues.
We should not forget that all IESG members are part of community, so
their advise and guide is already received at LC, so why does the
community body (i.e. the WG)leaves its decisions to others.
I do not support the document remaining silent on these issues.
I agree and support
Please, whatever you do, remove section 3 on the process note.
As it stands, it reads as follows:
* We're unable to find a way for the IESG and IAB to publish a document
together
* We really wish the IESG and IAB could publish a document together bbut
reluctantly being unable to do that we'll settle for a community
consensus document.
If you must say something how about:
In the past, architectural statements of this sort have been published
as joint products of the IESG and IAB. This document represents the
community consensus of the IETF and was published in accordance with the
processes in affect at time of publication.
In particular, I think a community statement of the whole community is
stronger than a joint IAB/IESG work product. I'd hope that the IESG and
IAB would support the team and say that "Hey, we're part of the
community, and a community consensus is how we present really strong
statements."
Yes, we all are part of the community but some bodies have different
authorities.
The IAB also has an ISOC role beyond the IETF. If they want to
emphasize support in that role, they could release a statement on their
own making that clear. However I think it would be more powerful if the
IAB worked with ISOC to release such a statement and was included in
that statement.
Yes I agree only that they don't add statements involve in this document.
I'm also still sputtering at the idea that our leadership cannot find a
way within the current process for the IESG and IAB to publish a
document together ifg they wanted to. I don't think that would be
desirable in this instance. We've changed and there's more focus on the
community than there was in the RFC 1984 days. However, I hope that if
it were the right thing to do our leadership could work together and
publish a joint document.
This document is about attacks on the community not attacks on
leaders. The old internet leaders are responsible for the attacks the
community got these days, so let us leave now the community guide
itself for the future. A WG or DT should do more work on this
document.
The current text really sounds like you
believe you couldn't. Let's try and be better team players than that.
In response to other last call comments:
I do not support the idea of taking the time to figure out how each WG
is impacted by this document.
Why not? The attacks (pervasive monitoring) are on all the community
so all WGs may be involved or responsible.
I understand the desire to figure out whether we have consensus that
pervasive monitoring is a threat quickly. If we find that we have some
open issues to resolve like the ones I bring up, but that we have
consensus on the basic point, we have a quick way forward. Jari could
announce that the consensus of the IETF 88 plenary has been confirmed on
the list and we could move forward.
Consensus by IETF on supporting a document is different of consensus
on some points, so we need a WG or we need more time to reach the
community (6 months may be the shortest time for this LC).
It's rare that the IETF acts in
plenary, but not rare that we make consensus calls about the big points
in documents while details are still open.
I agree we need more details on agreed points and then we need
consensus from WGs on the final document when ready before submission.
IMHO, if this document will be used by IESG then all WGs should agree
on the document.
AB