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Re: DMARC from the perspective of the listadmin of a bunch of SMALL community lists

2014-04-13 01:05:06

On Apr 12, 2014, at 3:23 PM, Brian E Carpenter 
<brian(_dot_)e(_dot_)carpenter(_at_)gmail(_dot_)com> wrote:

Hi,

In the DMARC draft, I noticed this:

Descriptions of the PolicyOverrideTypes:
...
  mailing_list:  Local heuristics determined that the message arrived
     via a mailing list, and thus authentication of the original
     message was not expected to succeed.

Could somebody explain what that means and whether it can be used to
mitigate the current issue? Or are substantial changes needed
in the fundamentals of DMARC?

I assume the authors will be adding a discussion of this issue
to the draft.

Regards
  Brian

Dear Brian,

There was an extension that foresaw this problem by offering a safe policy 
override scheme for third-party services that might result in DKIM signature 
failure.  DMARC often fails with messages from third-party services such as 
mailing-list.  Such failures normally result in these messages being placed 
into junk folders.  Unfortunately, too many ignore cautions about rejecting as 
can be demanded by DMARC.  This work began as 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-otis-dkim-tpa-label-06 by Daniel Black and 
myself that eventually resulted in http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6541.  Murray 
considered TPA too complex.  The TPA scheme could have avoided the very 
problems caused by DMARC policies placed on wrong account types.  DMARC is 
often promoted without its limitation being clearly stated or seemingly 
understood.  Does Yahoo expect mailing lists to drop users of their service?  

This could have been avoided without any disruption to mailing lists by a 
community generated list of known good third-party service providers published 
as hash labels.  Although IESG did not think SPF records able to generate 
hundreds of DNS transactions against otherwise uninvolved domains a concern, 
IESG regarded a single ATPS query against the authoritative domain a major 
threat that MUST be addressed by use of a "special" DKIM signature.  This IESG 
mandated change defeated efforts aimed at avoiding such disruptions and also 
made virtually any policy exception scheme non-deployable. 

The IESG needs to explain their thinking.  I can't, nor have they allowed a 
means for a functional alternative.

Regards,
Douglas Otis


On 13/04/2014 09:20, Miles Fidelman wrote:
Dave,

Dave Crocker wrote:
On 4/12/2014 12:56 PM, Miles Fidelman wrote:
- DMARC.org defines the "DMARC Base Specification" with a link to
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-kucherawy-dmarc-base/ - an IETF
document

While the Internet-Draft mechanism is operated by the IETF, it is an
open mechanism and issuance through it carries no automatic status,
particularly with respect to the IETF.

The DMARC specification is not 'an IETF document'.  The current plan
is to publish it as an RFC, through the 'Independent' stream, which
also is /not/ an IETF activity.


My point is that the folks behind dmarc PRESENT it in a way that
implicitly makes it look like an IETF document, and that it's on the
standards track.  The reality, as you say, is different.  "Plan to" is
vaporware.

- the referenced document is an informational  Internet draft, that

Drafts do not have status.  So the qualifier 'informational' here is
not meaningful.

As currently published, it carries the header

Intended status: Informational


In essence, DMARC is being represented as a mature, standards-track IETF
specification - with the implication that it's been widely vetted, and
is marching through the traditional experimental -> optional ->
recommended -> mandatory steps that IETF standards go through.

In reality:
- DMARC was developed by a tiny number of people, all of whom work for
very large ISPs

Well, a few of us who participated don't...

fair enough - but again, just look at http://dmarc.org/about.html - I
don't see your name, or any other small individuals or ISPs - what I do
see are
"A group of leading organizations came together in the spring of 2011"
and
"The founding contributors include:

* *Receivers:* AOL, Comcast, GMail, Hotmail, Netease, Yahoo! Mail
* *Senders:* American Greetings, Bank of America, Facebook, Fidelity,
  JP Morgan Chase, LinkedIn, PayPal
* *Intermediaries & Vendors:* Agari, Cloudmark, ReturnPath, Trusted
  Domain Project"

This was very much an industry-based effort.


- as far as I can tell, all input from the broader community - notably
mailing list developers and operators was roundly ignored or dismissed
(the transcript is really clear on this)

What transcript?  I'm not aware of its being 'ignored or dismissed'.

Funny, that's the impression I get when I read back through the archives
for dmarc-discuss(_at_)dmarc(_dot_)org and dmarc(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org

pretty much all discussion of aligning the From: field came down to -
"you change"


- while DMARC is at least partially tested, deploying and honoring
"p=reject" messages is brand new, and has wreaked tremendous damage
across the net

It's not new at all, though of course Yahoo's use is distinctive.

Depends on your definition of "new" - and while DMARC builds on an older
base, DMARC itself was started in 2011, and I assume the first standards
and software are more recent then that.

As you say, Yahoo's use is "distinctive" - though I'd use a somewhat
stronger word.


- as far as I can tell, those who are behind DMARC are taking the
position "it's not our problem" (see discussions on
dmarc-discuss(_at_)dmarc(_dot_)org and dmarc(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org) - and 
there is nary a Yahoo
representative to be seen anywhere

I've no idea what specifics you are referring to.

I've been following the discussions, on lots of lists, and I've yet to
see someone say even "I'm from Yahoo and we feel your pain" - much less
"hmm... maybe this wasn't such a good idea, we're going to back off and
implement in a slightly gentler manner - and maybe provide some support
to help patch the major list management packages" - or even "our
implementation honors Original-Authentication-Results"

nope - as far as I can tell, the folks who turned on p=reject at Yahoo
don't seem to have even told their own security or customer care folks
about what's going on - at least when this first broke, and I contacted
Yahoo's postmaster (thinking I needed to get our servers back on the
whitelist) - they just pointed me at the whitelist request form



The situation strikes me as incredibly perverse and broken - the more so
that the perpetrators are presenting this as blessed by the IETF
standards process.

I haven't seen anyone present such a claim of blessing.  Please point
to the specifics.

I fear you are confusing the difference between a desire for standards
status with a claim of its having been granted.

No... I'm quoting the way that dmarc.org is presenting the "DMARC Draft
Specification" - as marching through the IETF standards track, as it is
generally understood, and then hiding in the fine print that no such
thing has happened, or is currently happening

I'm not confused.  It is, and I think intentionally, being presented in
a way that is intended to confuse.  And I personally think that IETF
should be calling them on it.  Officially, loudly, and clearly.  (The
same way that Xerox and Kleenex jump down the throats of anybody who
tries to use their names generically.  )

Miles Fidelman



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