On Sat, Apr 12, 2014 at 4:35 PM,
<ned+ietf(_at_)mauve(_dot_)mrochek(_dot_)com> wrote:
The underlying technical issue is that the two technologies DMARC is built
on -
DKIM and SPF - both attach additional/restrictive semantics to
longstanding mail
system fields. (Broadly speaking, From: for DKIM and MAIL FROM for SPF.)
Something's amiss here. What new semantics does DKIM attach to From:? As
far as I know, it only requires that the field be signed. It doesn't
require that it be interpreted in a particular way or that it contain any
particular value.
I was trying to be brief. Yes, I'm well aware that DKIM can be used in other
ways. This entire discussion is within the context of DMARC here. Do you
disagree that DMARC's use of DKIM and SPF assign additional semantics to header
and envelope from fields respectively?
Like it or not, the IETF published a draft that defines certain mechanisms
which, if used improperly by a large provider, cause serious problems for a
large number of people. The text describing the consequences of the use of
those mechansisms in the drafts is, IMO, entirely inadequate.
It's the same document that was posted on other web sites for some time,
and was in use by a number of operators (including Yahoo) long before it
went into the datatracker.
So?
As it's only a draft, there's ample opportunity to make such improvements.
You're missing the point. When Yahoo made this change wouldn't it have been
nice to be able to point to the draft and say, "This is explicitly contrary
to what the draft says"?
Also: By "the IETF published a draft", are you talking about an RFC, or the
DMARC base draft?
The draft, of course.
It seems extreme to lay blame on the IETF in general
merely for having an open mechanism by which to post a draft for all to see
and discuss. A "Request For Comment", as it were.
You may think it extreme. I don't. I think the IETF's politics have led to it
inching closer to moral hazard territory for a long time, and with this
incident it has stepped in it.
Are you suggesting that
process should be closed or moderated somehow?
What I suggested is that we need to have a serious discussion of what, if
anything can be done to ameliorate the damage in this case. Others have
suggested that we also need to look at how to prevent this from happening
in the future. I concur.
And it's not like we didn't know. As others have pointed out, this issue
existed in the earlier ADSP proposal. It was given insufficient attention
there as well.
As with any draft, its content is only as good as its contributions and the
reviews it got.
I hope you're not saying that this is now fault of the people who failed to
contribute to the draft.
Of course the IETF can fall back on the usual excuses, including, but not
limited to:
Yahoo, of all ISPs, should have known better
We don't tell people what to do
It was just a draft
It was never intended to be a standard
We're not the Internet Protocol Police
etc.
I'm sorry, but this time none of these dogs are hunting for me. An
attractive
nuisance is an attractive nuisance, and this is what the IETF has, albeit
with
the best of intentions, managed to create.
I would add to this that, by its ultimate inaction in the face of a
protracted period of abuse and attempts by participants to solve that
problem within its procedures, the IETF has abdicated any authority it may
have had.
That may be your assessment. Given subsequent comments from other people, mine
is now that this effort was looking for a rubber stamp, didn't like it when
that didn't happen, and proceeded to skirt around the edges of the process.
With disasterous results.
Ned