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Re: Time to move beyond the 32 bit Internet.

2014-07-01 11:55:40

On Jul 1, 2014, at 3:45 AM, Fernando Gont 
<fernando(_at_)gont(_dot_)com(_dot_)ar> wrote:

IPv6 with a diode-firewall on the perimiter would essentially face the
same challenge/problem. I seem to recall folks noting that that's hw
they deploy v6 to the home...

Well, sort of. A zone-based firewall (NAT or otherwise) primarily allows in 
responses to traffic it has sent out, and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6092 
is an example of that. However, just as NATs do, such firewalls usually allow 
for a firewall rule that will allow specified traffic to go to a specified 
address. That’s the purpose of PCP, for example. 

That is a place I have well and truly scratched my head regarding the firewall 
discussion in the IETF. There’s a set of people, including me, that think that 
firewalls have a certain levee of utility and in any event are a business 
requirement. There’s another set of people who “don’t want no stinkin’ 
firewalls”, and argue their case on the basis of the end to end principle. No 
aspersions here; I understand their point, and my daughter’s surveillance 
service would be a case in point of the kind of service they want to enable.

Where my head tips is this. I see three kinds of traffic across that divide. 
One is sessions originated from the network - I sent something to Netflix, 
Facebook, or whoever, and it replied. The vast majority of residential traffic, 
I would guess, falls in that category, and apart from electric mail and traffic 
to business services to customers, I would guess that the vast majority of 
legitimate enterprise traffic does as well. A second is sessions originated 
from outside the network to services that the network intends to offer - web 
access to www.example.com, incoming SMTP, my daughter’s surveillance service 
(which is a web access), and so on. The third is “everything else” - traffic 
that wasn’t invited and has no application, and perhaps no host, to respond to 
it.

The first works in almost any case - a firewall that prevents you from running 
an application you want to run isn’t going to last very long. The second is 
trivially allowed for by a firewall rule or PCP/UPnP exchange, and if there is 
an application (set-top box or whatever) in the home that wants to allow for 
such a service, it can fire off the request. The third - what is the argument 
for letting that into my home or enterprise network? 

And I tend to think that the conversation breaks down at that point. Everyone 
agrees on the first and second. When someone says “I want to block the third”, 
the response is “but I want to allow the second” without acknowledging or 
commenting on the third. And I just find myself shaking my head in disbelief. 
Wouldn’t it be nice of both speakers in the conversation would address the same 
subject?

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