ietf
[Top] [All Lists]

Re: Security review of draft-ietf-pce-questions-06

2014-07-10 11:02:51
On 10 July 2014 16:58, Adrian Farrel <adrian(_at_)olddog(_dot_)co(_dot_)uk> 
wrote:
Hi Ben,

So you don't like my proposed solution?

I am not quite sure what you do consider a resolution to your concern. I can 
see three options:

1. Add security-related text to each section of this document.
2. Beef up the Security Considerations section with a subsection related to 
each section of the document.
3. Add a new section "How Secure is my PCE-Enabled System?" as I suggested.

Do you have a preference among these, or is there another option you like 
better?

I prefer 1, that way the security advice is likely to be read by
whoever reads that section - that is, by the people who are likely to
benefit from it.


Thanks,
Adrian


-----Original Message-----
From: Ben Laurie [mailto:benl(_at_)google(_dot_)com]
Sent: 09 July 2014 15:04
To: adrian(_at_)olddog(_dot_)co(_dot_)uk
Cc: IETF Discussion List; secdir(_at_)ietf(_dot_)org; The IESG
Subject: Re: Security review of draft-ietf-pce-questions-06

On 9 July 2014 09:55, Adrian Farrel <adrian(_at_)olddog(_dot_)co(_dot_)uk> 
wrote:
Hi Ben,

Thanks for taking the time to review this document and for posting your
comments to the IETF discussion list so that we can consider them as last 
call
comments.

[snip]

The security considerations section makes this claim:

"This informational document does not define any new protocol elements
or mechanism.  As such, it does not introduce any new security
issues."

I agree with the premise, but not the conclusion: just because an RFC
does not introduce new security issues, that does not mean that there
are no security considerations.

Indeed, this RFC discusses many things that have quite serious
security considerations, without mentioning any of them. For example,
section 4 "How Do I Find My PCE?" (the very first question) advocates
a number of potentially completely insecure mechanisms with no mention
of their security properties (or otherwise). This is obviously
pervasive, given the stance taken in the security considerations.

The document does mention that RFC 6952 gives a security analysis for
PCEP, and perhaps this is sufficient but it seems to me that a
document intended to give useful background information to noobs
should include security directly in that information rather than defer
to another giant document (which mixes PCEP info with other
protocols).

I don't believe that this document is strong on "advocacy", but discusses 
which
tools are out there and what some people do.

Previous PCE RFCs have given some attention to security concerns in the 
use of
PCE (RFC 4655), PCE discovery (RFC 4674, RFC 5088. RFC 5089), and the PCEP 
(RFC
4657 and RFC 5440). As such, "PCE Security" was not deemed by the authors to 
be
a previously "unanswered question" and so did not need attention in this
document.

That said, you are correct that the various sections do not discuss the 
security
implications relating to those sections. I would be pretty loathe to add 
security
text to each section in this document: I think that would make the document
heavy and less likely to be read by its intended consumers (it is not 
targeting
"noobs" although they are welcome to read it).

Your position appears to be that they will then go on to read much
heavier documents in order to discover the security properties of the
solutions you suggest, which seems a little unlikely, particularly if
there's no mention of the necessity to do so.

Or perhaps you think security is not important?

Perhaps a solution to this *is* to treat Security as an unanswered 
question and
add a section "How Secure is my PCE-Enabled System?" I can't think of a lot 
to
add there except for general egg-sucking guidance, but there would be a 
pointer
to the TCP-AO discussions currently going on in the WG. What do you think of
that as a way forward?

I have no idea what discussions are going on, but once more, if you
are concerned about "heaviness" of documentation, pointing at ongoing
discussions does not strike me as a route to lightness.