On 8/5/2014 8:14 PM, Scott Kitterman wrote:
It seems to me that all it means is that the MTA is taking the opportunity to
make the most secure connection it can on a peer basis. Sometime that's
going
to be a full DANE negotiated session protected by DNSSEC. Other times it's
not. I think the major point of opportunistic isn't how good the resulting
security is, but the idea of taking advantage of the best option available on
a per peer basis rather than treating it as all or nothing.
That looks like quite a good paragraph to me. I understand it, and it
describes something meaningful... and distinctive from current
approaches to use of encryption.
Focusing on a "framework that permits decreasing levels of encryption
protection" or similar language resonates with what I've been reading
about this opportunistic thing. (My own view is that cleartext has no
place within that hierarchy, so some sort of minimum encryption needs to
be described.
On 8/5/2014 8:16 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
DANE with authentication can be either opportunistic (enabled via
discovery on a peer by peer basis) or mandatory (required by local
policy, URI scheme, ...). Postfix for example supports both
opportunistic and mandatory DANE TLS:
Sorry, but I don't understand how "enabled via discovery on a peer by
peer basis" is any different from use of StartTLS. That sort of
confusion should not be prompted by 'definition' of such a basic term.
So while Scott's paragraph enjoys wonderfulness, what you are saying
still doesn't make much sense to me. Worse, I fear that language of the
sort you are using will prove not very useful to the community.
d/
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Dave Crocker
Brandenburg InternetWorking
bbiw.net